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Developments in Administrative Law:
The 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 Terms
Laverne Jacobs*

I. INTRODUCTION
In the 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 terms, the Supreme Court of Canada
was called upon to decide many complex issues that not only developed
the jurisprudence in administrative law but furthered simultaneously
principles of methodology and substance in other areas of law, particularly
human rights.1
Fleshing out the appropriate relationship between judicial review on
administrative and constitutional law grounds was a dominant preoccupation
of the Court in the 2005-2006 term. The relationship between constitutional
and administrative law principles was revisited in the 2006 decision of
Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys,2 shedding new
light on continuing debates. Multani dealt with the appropriate methodology
to be used when a decision made by an administrative body may violate
Charter rights.3
After a very intense term examining questions of exclusive and
concurrent jurisdiction in 2004-2005, the Supreme Court of Canada
continued its discussions in two decisions dealing with jurisdiction in
the 2005-2006 term: Tranchemontagne v. Ontario (Director, Disability
*
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1

Two such cases in this regard are Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. Via Rail
Canada Inc., [2007] S.C.J. No. 15, 2007 SCC 15; and McGill University Health Centre (Montreal
General Hospital) v. Syndicat des employés de l’Hôpital général de Montréal, [2007] S.C.J. No. 4,
[2007] 1 S.C.R. 161.
2
[2006] S.C.J. No. 6, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256 [hereinafter “Multani”].
3
In 2007, Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, 2007
SCC 9 [hereinafter “Charkaoui”], provided perspective on the relationship between constitutional
and administrative law from another angle. Through an analysis of whether s. 7 Charter relief could
be gained for ex parte review of certificates of admissibility on grounds of national security (and an
ultimate holding that such relief was warranted), the Supreme Court provided precision on the
concept of “fundamental justice” in an administrative (immigration) context. Charkaoui is not
discussed in the present article. It is examined in the article on constitutional law developments by
C. Mathen and M. Plaxton in this volume.
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Support Program);4 and Bisaillon v. Concordia University.5 In
Tranchemontagne, the Court formulated some guiding principles on the
method for deciding between concurrent administrative decision-making
fora. The issue in Tranchemontagne was who, between a human rights
tribunal and a social benefits tribunal, should have jurisdiction to decide
whether a legislative provision complies with the provincial human rights
code. Concordia University pushed further the question of exclusive
jurisdiction that had plagued the Court in the 2004-2005 term, this time
with respect to whether the Québec Superior Court should exercise its
exclusive jurisdiction to hear a potential labour class action suit.
Standard of review was the third major issue addressed by the Court.
In the 2006-2007 term, two important cases were decided: Lévis (City)
v. Fraternité des policiers de Lévis Inc.;6 and Council of Canadians with
Disabilities v. Via Rail Canada Inc.7 Each addressed the issue of when
multiple standards of review versus one standard should apply to an
administrative decision.
Overall, the 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 terms were periods in which
the Court opened debates that had deeply entrenched and often tangled
roots in its administrative law jurisprudence. This article examines these
three major issues addressed by the Court in the 2005-2006 and 2006-2007
terms — namely: (1) the relationship between administrative law review
and review under the Charter; (2) exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction; and
(3) standard of review.8 Through this article, the new points of guidance
4

[2006] S.C.J. No. 14, 2006 SCC 14 [hereinafter “Tranchemontagne”].
[2006] S.C.J. No. 19, 2006 SCC 19 [hereinafter “Concordia University”].
6
[2007] S.C.J. No. 14, 2007 SCC 14 [hereinafter “City of Lévis”].
7
[2007] S.C.J. No. 15, 2007 SCC 15 [hereinafter “Via Rail”].
8
Additional cases decided in the two terms are as follows: in the 2005-2006 term: Zenner
v. Prince Edward Island College of Optometrists, [2005] S.C.J. No. 80, 2005 SCC 77, dealing with
standard of review; May v. Ferndale Institution, [2005] S.C.J. No. 84, 2005 SCC 82, a particularly
interesting case showing the value of the prerogative writs and a renewed interest in them; Canada
(Human Rights Commission) v. Canadian Airlines International Ltd., [2006] S.C.J. No. 1, 2006
SCC 1, dealing with statutory interpretation and the interplay between the Canadian Human Rights
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6 and its guidelines; Isidore Garon ltée v. Tremblay; Fillion et Frères (1976)
inc. v. Syndicat national des employés de garage du Québec inc., [2006] S.C.J. No. 3, 2006 SCC 2,
which dealt with the issue of whether a labour arbitrator has jurisdiction to determine if a notice of
termination of employment complies with minimum statutory employment standards under the Civil
Code of Québec; ATCO Gas & Pipelines Ltd. v. Alberta (Energy & Utilities Board), [2006] S.C.J.
No. 4, 2006 SCC 4, which dealt with the sale of property by a tribunal; and Goodis v. Ontario
(Ministry of Correctional Services), [2006] S.C.J. No. 31, dealing with access to government
information, and the exemption for solicitor-client privilege. Two municipal law cases were also
decided in the 2005-2006 Supreme Court term: Montréal (City) v. 2952-1366 Québec Inc., [2005]
S.C.J. No. 63, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 141, dealing with the validity of a municipal by-law and whether
this by-law infringed Charter guarantee of freedom of expression; and Charlebois v. Saint John
5
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provided by the Court will be reviewed and the ways in which these
current cases further the principles of past administrative law jurisprudence
will be discussed.

II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW AND
REVIEW UNDER THE CHARTER
1. Introduction: Revisiting the Foundational Cases of Slaight
Communications and Ross
Multani is a decision that deals with the appropriate methodology
for judicial review of an administrative body’s decision when that decision
allegedly violates constitutional or quasi-constitutional rights. The central
debate in Multani concerns the relationship between administrative and
constitutional law approaches to judicial review when an exercise of
administrative discretion affects Charter rights and freedoms. This debate
first surfaced in 1989 with the Supreme Court of Canada decision
in Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson.9 Although the concerns
underlying it have deep consequences on more than one level — i.e., for
administrative and constitutional law theory and, more importantly, for
the individuals whose constitutional rights and freedoms may be affected,
this debate has remained unresolved in Supreme Court jurisprudence. In
order to situate the issues in Multani within their theoretical framework,
it is useful to briefly set out four decisions that provide the context for
these concerns over judicial review methodology. These cases are: Slaight
Communications; Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15;10 Trinity
Western University v. British Columbia College of Teachers;11 and
Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36.12
(City), [2005] S.C.J. No. 77, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 563, dealing with these invisible law cases are examined
in detail by Jerry V. DeMarco in “Developments in Environmental and Municipal Law”: The 2005-2006
Term (2006) 35 S.C.L.R. (2d) 275. In the 2006-2007 Supreme Court term, there were two additional
cases of an administrative law nature: McGill University Health Centre (Montréal General Hospital)
v. Syndicat des employés de l’Hôpital général de Montréal, [2007] S.C.J. No. 4, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 161,
dealing with the extent to which collective agreements should be used to determine an employer’s
duty to accommodate; and London (City) v. RSJ Holdings Inc., [2007] S.C.J. No. 29, 2007 SCC 29,
a municipal law case dealing with transparency and its full process, which is discussed in detail by
Jerry V. DeMarco, “Developments in Municipal Law: The 2006-2007 Term” of this volume at 498-507.
9
[1989] S.C.J. No. 45, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 [hereinafter “Slaight Communications”].
10
[1996] S.C.J. No. 40, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825 [hereinafter “Ross”].
11
[2001] S.C.J. No. 32, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772 [hereinafter “Trinity Western”].
12
[2002] S.C.J. No. 87, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 710 [hereinafter “Chamberlain”].
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In Slaight Communications, a labour arbitrator determined that an
employee of a radio station had been wrongfully dismissed.13 As part of
a discretionary remedy, the arbitrator ordered the employer to write a
reference letter and he specified the content. He also ordered the employer
to respond to inquiries about the employee uniquely with this letter. Among
the pieces of information that the arbitrator had directed to the employer
to include in the letter were the employee’s sales performance results,
the degree to which he had met or surpassed his quotas and the fact that
an adjudicator had found his determination to be an unjust dismissal. The
employer sought judicial review, arguing that the letter infringed its
freedom of expression guaranteed under the Canadian Charter.
At the Supreme Court, given the relative newness of the Charter at
the time, a question arose as to the relationship between administrative
law review and review under the Charter. The majority of the Court
agreed with the approach taken by Lamer J. in his minority concurring
decision. Justice Lamer first examined the arbitrator’s two orders to
see whether they fell outside of the jurisdiction granted to him by the
enabling statute. He found one order to be outside of the arbitrator’s
jurisdiction and therefore, patently unreasonable (using the terminology
and understandings of that time); the other was within the arbitrator’s
jurisdiction and therefore not unreasonable. Having completed the
administrative law component of his review, Lamer J. continued by
subjecting the order that he found to be reasonable on administrative
law grounds (i.e., that had been decided within the arbitrator’s statutory
jurisdiction) to an analysis under the Charter. The order that he found to
be unreasonable was simply set aside.
Slaight Communications offers two elements to the debate over how
to review alleged Charter violations that occur with an administrative
context. It provided the methodology that was used by Lamer C.J. — i.e.,
to begin with an administrative law review, applying a Charter justification
analysis to any parts of the administrative decision that still remained
valid. In addition, Dickson C.J. offered his general prediction that the
“precise relationship between the traditional standard administrative law
review of patent unreasonableness and new constitutional standard of
review will be worked out in future cases”.14

13
Slaight Communications is discussed in J.M. Evans, “Developments in Administrative
Law: The 1988-89 Term” (1990) 1 S.C.L.R. (2d) 1, at 24-34.
14
See Slaight Communications, supra, note 9, at para. 11.
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Decided in 1996, Ross essentially adopted the approach used in Slaight
Communications. However, it added some precision to the way that the
administrative law and constitutional law standards were to be applied.
In Ross, the Court held that the two standards were not to be collapsed
into one. If Charter values were invoked by the decision under review, the
section 1 analysis was the more appropriate analysis to use. Administrative
law review was only necessary if no Charter values were at play.
Moreover, the Court in Ross asserted that if an administrative decision
could withstand the section 1 analysis then it was unlikely that it would
also be found to be patently unreasonable on administrative law grounds.
Conversely, an administrative law decision found to be unconstitutional
under section 1 analysis would not need to be subjected to administrative
law review — there is no question that an unconstitutional decision exceeds
the jurisdiction of any administrative decision-maker. Interestingly, despite
the fact that the standard of review jurisprudence had progressed, by the
time Ross was decided,15 still only the standard of patent unreasonableness
was incorporated into the test.
Finally, Chamberlain and Trinity Western are two recent cases in
which an administrative decision engaged Charter values, although not
necessarily the Charter itself. In both cases, the Supreme Court reviewed
the decision using solely an administrative law approach. In Multani, the
question of the appropriate way to engage administrative and constitutional
review was once again addressed — this time against the backdrop of
the evolution of the administrative law standard of review jurisprudence.
2. Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys
In Multani, a Sikh student alleged that his freedom of religion,
guaranteed by sections 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms16 and section 3 of Québec’s Charter of human rights and
freedoms,17 had been infringed by the decision of a school board
commission. The school board commission rendered its decision further
to the discretion granted to it under the Education Act.18 A central question

15
See notably, Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers), [1994] S.C.J. No. 58,
[1994] 2 S.C.R. 557.
16
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
17
R.S.Q. c. C-12 [hereinafter “Québec Charter”].
18
R.S.Q. c. I-13.3, ss. 12, 76.
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at issue in Multani was whether the decision should be reviewed using
constitutional or administrative law principles.19
Gurbaj Singh Multani was an orthodox Sikh who wore a kirpan,
a small religious object made of metal that is shaped like a dagger and is
worn under clothing. In November 2001, Gurbaj Singh accidentally dropped
his kirpan in the schoolyard. The school board sent his parents a letter
which authorized their son to wear his kirpan to school provided that
he comply with certain conditions to ensure that it was sealed inside
his clothing. The school board considered this to be a reasonable
accommodation. Gurbaj Singh and his parents agreed to the conditions.
The school’s governing board, however, refused to ratify the agreement.
They found that wearing a kirpan violated the school’s code of conduct
as it prohibited weapons and dangerous objects from the school. Upon
appeal by the Multanis to the school board’s council of commissioners
(the “council”), the council upheld the decision of the governing board. The
council was prepared to permit the wearing of a symbolic kirpan in the
form of a pendant or in another form, provided that it was made of a
material that rendered it harmless.
Gurbaj Singh’s father sought a declaratory judgment and interlocutory
injunction in the Québec Superior Court. His motion asked the court to
declare the council’s decision of no force or effect and to declare that
Gurbaj Singh had a right to wear his kirpan to school if sealed and sewn
up in his clothes. He argued that wearing the kirpan in such a way
represented a reasonable accommodation of his son’s religious freedom
and equality rights. An interlocutory injunction was granted which
authorized Gurbaj Singh to wear his kirpan provided that he comply
with the conditions initially set by the school board until a final decision
was rendered in the case. Ultimately, the Superior Court declared the
council’s decision null and of no force or effect and authorized Gurbaj
Singh’s right to wear his kirpan under certain conditions. The Québec
Court of Appeal reversed this decision.20 Gurbaj Singh Multani’s father

19
The majority concurring judges framed the standard of review question as a preliminary
issue. See Multani, supra, note 2, at paras. 15ff.
20
See Québec (Procureur-général) v. Singh (Multani), [2004] Q.J. No. 1904 (C.A.).
The Québec Court of Appeal reasoned that the kirpan was, in essence, a dagger and as such, was an
inherently dangerous object. The Court held (at paras. 87 and 89) that while banning any object
capable of causing harm would be unreasonable, it was within reasonable limits to prohibit the
possession of an intrinsically dangerous object like the kirpan:
This regulation from the Code of Conduct cannot go so far as to prohibit the possession
of any object which can cause injury; indeed, even a pencil can be used to inflict injury.
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then appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. The Supreme Court held
that the decision of the school board had infringed Gurbaj Singh’s freedom
of religion. Regardless of whether they opted to use the Oakes test or to
review on administrative law grounds, no member of the Court was
convinced that the absolute prohibition of the kirpan was necessary. The
Court was not persuaded by the respondent’s arguments that the kirpan
is a symbol of violence, that allowing kirpans in school would promote
their use for violence and undermine the goal of safety in schools, or
that allowing Sikh students to wear kirpans would lead to perceptions of
a double standard. The Court of Appeal decision was therefore set aside
and the council’s decision was declared to be null.
The Court’s decision presents three concurring sets of reasons with
strong points of divergence. The primary point of disagreement dealt
with the correct way to view the matter: as a constitutional question with
administrative law aspects or as an administrative action that may have
violated a constitutional right. Overall, the discussion between the majority
and minority judges revisits and develops the jurisprudential debate started
earlier with Slaight Communications over the control of administrative
discretion when that exercise of discretion affects Charter rights and
freedoms. This important aspect of administrative law had not been
addressed since Slaight Communications and Ross. The plurality of views
presented by the Court shows that this issue is one fraught with difficulty,
especially in light of the evolution of the administrative law jurisprudence
that had occurred in the interim.
(a) Majority Concurring Reasons: Chief Justice McLachlin and
Bastarache, Binnie, Fish and Charron JJ.
The majority began by discussing whether a standard of review
analysis should apply to the review of a constitutional question that arises
within an administrative decision-making context. The issue of standard
of review had been raised for the first time at the Court of Appeal which
had held that the appropriate standard was reasonableness simpliciter.
Nevertheless, a reasonable line must be drawn, and an inherently dangerous object falls
beyond that line.
Stripped of its symbolic religious significance, the kirpan has all of the physical
characteristics of an edged weapon... .
The Court relied on Nijjar v. Canada 3000 Airlines Ltd., [1999] C.H.R.D. No. 3, No. T.D. 3/99
and R. v. Hothi, [1985] M.J. No. 318, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 31, affd [1986] 3 W.W.R. 671 (C.A.), leave to
appeal to S.C.C refused (1986), 70 N.R. 397n (S.CC.), where kirpans had been banned from airplanes
and courtrooms respectively, in support of its decision.
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The Court of Appeal’s standard of review analysis sought to find an
appropriate medium between the two ways of viewing the case before it.
Multani presented a strong human rights element as well as concern
regarding the regulation of the school environment, including safety within
the school. Considering the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence
holding that less deference should be owed to administrative bodies
determining human rights questions because of the comparable, if not
greater, expertise in human rights possessed by the courts, and keeping
an ear tuned to decisions such as R. v. M. (M.R.),21 which emphasized
the experience and knowledge of school authorities not shared by the
courts, the Quebec Court of Appeal found that reasonableness simpliciter
struck a correct balance between judicial intervention and restraint.
Reasonableness simpliciter was also the standard adopted by the majority
of the Supreme Court of Canada in Chamberlain — a school board case
that similarly involved a human rights dimension.22
At the Supreme Court, the majority concurring opinion held that
the administrative law standard of review was not applicable at all. The
majority asserted that a section 1 analysis is the only test for determining
if an infringement of protected rights is constitutional. Justice Charron’s
reasons for preferring a constitutional justification analysis were anchored
on three main points. First, she reasoned that using administrative law
standards could, at the very least, cause confusion between constitutional
and administrative law principles. At worst, they could reduce fundamental
rights and freedoms to mere administrative law principles. Referring
to Dickson C.J. in Slaight Communications, Charron J. asserted that
constitutional justification offered a more sophisticated and structured
analysis that was preferable to the inadequacy of the standard of review
analysis.
Justice Charron’s second main reason centred on the insignificance
of “validity” to the current decision. From a reading of her reasons, it is
clear that “validity” is a term that refers solely to whether the council had
made its decision within the jurisdiction given to it by statute.23 Justice
Charron pointed out that the validity of the rule against weapons that the
school board had adopted had not been challenged at all. The complaint

21

[1998] S.C.J. No. 83, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 393 [hereinafter “M. (M.R.)”].
Although in Chamberlain, supra, note 12, while Charter values were at play, the Court
was not asked to determine if the school board had complied with the Charter itself.
23
This is discussed below.
22
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was based entirely on the potential violation of a constitutional freedom.
An administrative law analysis was therefore inapropriate.
Finally, without much discussion of this point, Charron J. asserted
that the standard of review was irrelevant because it had been established
in Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin24 that the
correctness standard would always apply in the judicial review of
an administrative decision that was “based on the application and
interpretation of the Canadian Charter”.25 The implication here seems to
be that, ultimately, under the correctness test, the Court’s decision based
on a section 1 analysis could replace that of the school board council.
Spending time determining the appropriate standard of review was
therefore unnecessary.
(b) Minority Concurring Reasons: Justices Deschamps and Abella
In contrast to the majority, Deschamps and Abella JJ. were of the
opinion that the analysis of the issues in Multani should be completed
within the framework of an administrative law review. Determining the
standard of review was therefore an essential first step. Justices Deschamps
and Abella provided two major reasons in support of this opinion. Their
first argument was based on a distinction between a “norm” and a
“decision”. The characteristic of a norm is that it is a principle or rule of
general application such as those created by a legislature through statutes
or delegated legislation; by contrast, a decision is generally understood
to be the result of the application of a norm to a particular set of facts.26
They asserted that constitutional justification had been designed to analyze
the validity or enforceability of norms only. When it comes to assessing the
validity of an administrative decision, the constitutional justification
analysis cannot be easily transferred to administrative decisions.
In elaborating their reasons, Deschamps and Abella JJ. developed
these ideas. They questioned the “unified analysis” that Lamer J. had
introduced in his minority decision in Slaight Communications. The unified
approach proposes that an order or decision can be analyzed in the same
way as a law and should be subject to constitutional analysis if Charter
values are at play. Justices Deschamps and Abella noted that the case
24

[2003] S.C.J. No. 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504 [hereinafter “Martin”]
See Multani, supra, note 2, at para. 20.
26
Justices Deschamps and Abella outlined most clearly the distinction between a norm and
a decision or order in Multani, id., at para. 112.
25
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law is not settled on this issue. For example, the majority in Slaight
Communications itself may not have agreed with the unified approach,
holding only that the appropriate relationship between administrative law
review and constitutional review would have to be “worked out in future
cases”.27 Moreover, in Deschamps and Abella JJ.’s view, this comment
has been interpreted in an ambivalent fashion since that time. In Ross,
for example, the majority’s comment in Slaight Communications was
interpreted to favour a constitutional analysis whenever constitutional
values are at issue, whereas in the more recent cases of Trinity Western
and Chamberlain, the Supreme Court of Canada went the other way and
used administrative law principles despite the fact that Charter values
were involved.
Beyond the unsettled nature of the jurisprudence, they also had several
practical reasons for being wary of including administrative decisions in
the concept of “law”. Given that section 1 uses “reasonable limits as
prescribed by law” as the boundary to circumscribe guaranteed rights
and freedoms, incorporating decisions which are individualized in nature
and based on the outcome of norms applied to specific fact situations
would prevent litigants and administrative bodies from knowing in advance
the status of fundamental rights. Justices Deschamps and Abella pointed
out, however, that if a norm such as the code of conduct or one of its
provisions had been challenged, then a section 1 constitutional analysis
would have been appropriate.28
Moreover, including decisions within the section 1 concept of “law”
would have implications for the role of the administrative decision-maker.
On the one hand, an administrative body in the process of producing its
decision would be subject to a “bifurcated obligation”. It would have to
turn its mind to being able to justify some parts of its decision on
administrative law principles and other parts on constitutional law
grounds.29 On the other hand, using the section 1 analysis could introduce
problems relating to the burden of proof. There would be problems in
the administration of justice relating to the nature of evidence that would
have to be adduced by administrative decision-makers in order to justify
their decisions. Although their reasons are not entirely clear, Deschamps
and Abella JJ. seem to be suggesting that administrative decision-makers
27

See Slaight Communications, supra, note 9, at para. 11.
See Multani, supra, note 2, at para. 138.
29
The idea of a bifurcated obligation is discussed by Deschamps and Abella JJ. in Multani,
id., at para. 111.
28
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and, in particular, those with quasi-judicial functions may need to rely
on the government to present their positions. However, reliance on the
government would have to be tempered by an appreciation of the tribunal’s
role as independent of government, and the government may not, in any
event, have all the information necessary to justify the decision made.30
Finally, it would blur the role of the administrative decision-maker by
forcing it to justify its decision in relation to section 1 of the Charter
before the reviewing court. If this were done, the tribunal would
conceptually gain an interest in the dispute before it and take on the role
of a party to it. The roles of decision-maker or arbiter and party would
thus become imprecise.31
Their second major argument was that an administrative decision
that violates the Canadian Charter would not be able to withstand judicial
review on administrative law grounds. Justices Deschamps and Abella
argued that the standard of review approach was demanding enough to
render invalid any decision of an administrative body that fails to consider
constitutional values. Since cases like Baker had held that an administrative
law analysis incorporates Charter principles, it was unnecessary to resort
to a constitutional justification. Overall, keeping with an administrative
law analysis would avoid blurring the distinction between principles of
constitutional justification and principles of administrative law and would
keep pure the analytical tools developed for each of these fields.32
Unlike the majority, Deschamps and Abella JJ. framed the issue in
Multani as being whether the school board’s decision was valid in light
of the offer of accommodation made by the father and the student.33 They
determined that reasonableness was the appropriate standard of review.
Applying this standard, they held that the school board did not sufficiently
consider Gurbaj Singh’s freedom of religion or the accommodation
measures that he and his father had proposed. Instead, the school board
had simply applied the code of conduct literally. In so doing, the school
board made an unreasonable decision.

30
31
32
33

See Multani, id., at para. 111.
This is discussed in Multani, id., at para. 123.
See id., at paras. 126-28, and paras. 85-86.
The issue is framed this way by Deschamps and Abella JJ. in Multani, id., at para. 92.
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(c) Minority Concurring Reasons: Justice LeBel
Lastly, LeBel J. in a brief, concurring decision of his own, argued
for a much more nuanced approach to the entire debate over whether to
use administrative or constitutional law principles of review. He agreed
that it was better to start by attempting to solve a problem such as the
one in Multani through the use of administrative law principles. He stated
that it is not always necessary to resort to a Charter analysis (or analysis
under the Québec Charter) if a decision can be reached using general
administrative law principles or the specific rules governing the exercise
of a delegated power. At the same time, however, he noted that a
constitutional analysis is sometimes unavoidable due to the context of
the dispute.
To a certain extent, LeBel J. agreed with the analysis of Deschamps
and Abella JJ. He thought it unquestionable that under the approach
proposed by Deschamps and Abella JJ., the decision of the council would
be quashed. However, he added that if the decision were quashed because
of the violation of constitutional standard then it would become necessary
to do a constitutional analysis to determine if the violation of the
constitutional right or freedom was justifiable. At that stage, it is necessary
to consider the constitutional rights in issue and how they have been
applied.
Ultimately, LeBel J.’s discussion suggests that while he is in favour
of constitutional analysis in appropriate circumstances, he does not believe
that the current section 1 justification analysis provides all that needs to
be assessed. In particular, the current section 1 analysis does not deal
with the content of rights or with competing rights and how they should
be reconciled.
Justice LeBel also expressed concern with the norm-decision dichotomy
proposed by Deschamps and Abella JJ. He found that it would present
many problems in application. He also indicated that he shared the same
concerns as the majority — namely, that regardless of whether the
infringement of rights and freedoms stems from a normative rule or from
the application of that normative rule, the effect on the complainant is
the same.34 From the perspective of the complainant, all that matters is
that the violation, if there is one, be rectified.
Overall, LeBel J.’s proposed framework maintains that it is valid to
start with administrative law principles in order to determine whether an
34

See Multani, id., at paras. 20 and 151.
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administrative act is consistent with the powers delegated by legislation
to the administrative body. If the act is authorized, the body’s actual
exercise of discretion should then be assessed in light of constitutional
guarantees and their values. However, unlike the rest of his colleagues,
when it came to the analysis of the potential infringement of constitutional
rights, LeBel J. turned first to the question of how to reconcile competing
constitutional rights if a conflict exists. For this he had two possible
approaches. The first would involve defining the rights and considering
how they should relate to each other. The second would involve using a
section 1 analysis to see if the infringement could be justified. As for
the application of the Oakes test, LeBel J.’s analysis became even more
nuanced. He opined that certain steps of the Oakes test may not be
necessary in certain situations. For example, if the statutory authority under
which an administrative body makes its decision has not been challenged,
a review of the objectives of the statute would not be necessary. In such
a situation, the elements of the Oakes test that will be used are those
relating to proportionality, including any issues of accommodation.
Because of the facts in Multani, LeBel J.’s first approach — namely,
that of defining rights and their relationship was not relevant — in Multani
there were no competing rights. Instead, his second approach — a section 1
analysis — was used. Justice LeBel found that the school board did not
meet its burden of proof. It had not convinced the Court that prohibiting
Gurbaj Singh’s kirpan altogether was a reasonable limit on the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of religion. As a result, he agreed with the conclusion
and remedy proposed by his colleagues.
(i) Commentary
Unquestionably, the main point preventing the majority and LeBel
J. from agreeing with Deschamps and Abella JJ. is that the former set of
judges were not convinced that an administrative law approach would
provide an appropriate or effective evaluation of constitutional values.
For Charron J. and the majority, the necessity of using a constitutional
justification analysis arises whenever the constitutional question can be
seen to be the “dominant” question at issue in the matter under review.
As for LeBel J., although he agreed with the minority that starting an
analysis with an administrative law approach was valid, he also believed
that it was necessary to go further. Once a decision had been found to be
invalid on administrative law grounds, it was necessary to conduct a
constitutional analysis in order to decide if constitutional rights or freedoms
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had been unjustifiably infringed. For LeBel J., however, the current
constitutional justification under section 1 of the Charter did not offer a
satisfactory tool of analysis.
From the standpoint of administrative law theory, one wonders if it is
possible to link the current standard of review analysis with a section 1
justification. While this will not fully address LeBel J.’s concerns, it
might address the concerns of Charron J. and the majority. Such a link
could broadly be drawn through the concept of “reasonable limit” in
section 1. A decision that is a reasonable limit imposed by law should
not only be made within the boundaries of the deference that it is
appropriate to show to the decision-maker but should also be valid on
Charter grounds. A very good argument can be made that a decision
that violates the Charter and is therefore unconstitutional should attract
no deference whatsoever. Nevertheless, there is some merit to the idea
of employing the checks and balances of administrative review when
the impugned decision has been made through a process that the legislature
has designated. Determining the appropriate standard of review will also
help to establish the remedial route that should be taken. Administrative
law’s remedies are not always to substitute the decision of the court but
may be to return the matter for reconsideration by the administrative
body. What I propose is that the section 1 constitutional justification be
integrated more explicitly within the administrative framework of analysis.
Similar to the approach taken by Deschamps and Abella JJ. in Multani,
the proposed linkage would take place at the stage of applying (as opposed
to determining) the standard of review. Each of the three standards
could serve as a way to open the door to deciding when a constitutional
justification analysis is needed. For example, if the standard of review is
determined to be patent unreasonableness, then courts could determine that
a potential Charter violation is a patent enough error to attract review.
The review of this potential Charter violation would then be done using
a section 1 analysis, with the result that an unjustifiable violation could
cause the decision to be returned. As for the standard of reasonableness,
if the reasons given in an administrative decision cannot support the
conclusion reached (Southam) because there appears to be an infringement
of a Charter guarantee, then a section 1 analysis can assist in determining
whether the standard of reasonableness has been met. Clearly, an
unjustifiable Charter infringement will render any decision unreasonable.
Finally, correctness is perhaps the easiest standard to apply. If, based on
a constitutional justification analysis, the decision shows an unjustifiable
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Charter infringement, the decision can be quashed with the court substituting
its reasons for those given by the administrative decision-maker.
Linking Charter justification and administrative law review in this
way not only offers the opportunity for more thorough constitutional
review within an administrative context, it also respects the expertise
and responsibilities that have been entrusted to administrative actors by
the legislature. As well, the majority’s reasoning seems to have been
motivated by the concern that administrative law principles will not yield
as just a result as constitutional principles. Infusing the administrative
framework with the constitutional justification analysis in cases of review
of administrative discretion may address this.
However, beyond the narrow perspective of administrative law
theory lays a much more disconcerting concern: should the constitutional
and administrative law approaches yield similar, if not the same, results?
If the risk that the two approaches will provide such different results is
so significant that it has caused such divides in the Court, then this
signals a fundamental disconnect between the paths of law and justice.
Certainly, for the average litigants such as Mr. Multani and his son, there
is a reasonable expectation that a just result will ensue regardless of
whether their case is presented as one of constitutional or administrative
law. Moreover, given the greater amount of Charter responsibility given
to tribunals as confirmed in Martin, one can envision many more
constitutional matters coming through administrative channels. It is still
debatable whether Martin stands for the proposition that constitutional
questions decided by tribunals will always be decided on a correctness
standard. It is also debatable whether the courts will continue to maintain
three standards of review (discussed below). Nevertheless, regardless of
these uncertainties, it would be encouraging, from the perspective of
access to justice, to see more uniformity in the Court’s results.
On a similar note, one cannot help but notice the comments of the
majority on using reasonable accommodation principles developed under
statutory human rights regimes to aid in the section 1 analysis. There is
a rich literature on the use of Charter principles in the development of
jurisprudence under statutory human rights regimes — much of it weaves
a cautionary tale.35 It will be interesting to see how the inverse approach
to human rights law cross-fertilization, started in Multani, will develop.
35
See, for example, Leslie Reaume, “Postcards from O’Malley: Reinvigorating Statutory
Human Rights Jurisprudence in the Age of the Charter” and Andrea Wright, “Formulaic Comparisons:
Stopping the Charter at the Statutory Human Rights Gate”, in Fay Faraday, Margaret Denike and
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Finally, one very surprising aspect of the decision in Multani stems
from the majority and LeBel J.’s presentation of the concept of “validity”
in the administrative law sense. In their view, validity dealt only with
whether or not the administrative decision-maker had made its decision
within the boundaries of the jurisdiction set out in its constituent
legislation.36 Often referred to as the patently unreasonable test, this
approach of reviewing for excess of jurisdiction for various reasons
including bad faith, deciding for improper purposes, etc. was traditionally
used for the review of discretionary decisions.
However, this understanding of the validity of decisions in
administrative law has evolved considerably as part of the development
of the standard of review jurisprudence in the past several years. Most
notably, in Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)37
the majority of the Court made a concerted effort to have the standard of
review for both discretionary and non-discretionary decisions decided
by way of the pragmatic and functional approach. It is surprising that
despite these parallel developments of the Supreme Court, the patently
unreasonable test was the only test for validity considered by the majority
of the Court in Multani.
The relationship between the administrative law standard of review
and constitutional standard of review under the Charter is an issue that
has certainly not been settled by Multani; if anything Multani has
introduced many more aspects of the debate that need to be confronted
and examined critically. I have addressed a few in these comments but
there are certainly others, such as the norm-decision dichotomy, that the
Court will likely revisit in the future.38

M. Kate Stephenson, eds., Making Equality Rights Real: Securing Substantive Equality under the
Charter (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006).
36
See, for example, Charron J.’s perspective which is outlined quite clearly in Multani at
para. 19 where she states:
There is no suggestion that the council of commissioners did not have jurisdiction,
from an administrative law standpoint, to approve the Code de vie. Nor, it should be noted,
is the administrative and constitutional validity of the rule against carrying weapons and
dangerous objects in issue. It would appear that the Code de vie was never even introduced
into evidence by the parties. Rather, the appellant argues that it was in applying the rule,
that is, in categorically denying Gurbaj Singh the right to wear his kirpan, that the governing
board, and subsequently the council of commissioners when it upheld the original decision,
infringed Gurbaj Singh’s freedom of religion under the Canadian Charter.
37
[1999] S.C.J. No. 39, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817.
38
For a very thoughtful analysis of Multani and the concept of law under section 1 of the
Charter, see Han-Ru Zhou, “Développements récents en droit constitutionnel durant l’année 2005-2006:
les arrêts Multani, 2952-1366 Québec Inc. et Imperial Tobacco” (2006), 35 S.C.L.R. (2d) 413.
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III. EXCLUSIVE AND CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
During the 2004-2005 Supreme Court term, the Court’s decisions
showed a preoccupation with questions relating to exclusive and
concurrent jurisdiction. The Court’s primary concern at that time was to
establish appropriate methodologies for determining the correct decisionmaker to decide a matter when more than one decision-making body
seemed capable of receiving it. In my analysis of the 2004-2005 cases, I
suggested there were still many unanswered questions and much room
for development of the jurisprudence regarding exclusive and concurrent
jurisdiction.39 It seemed almost inevitable that questions of exclusive
and concurrent jurisdiction would continue to plague the Court. In the
2005-2006 term, the Court had occasion to revisit and develop further
the principles it had established earlier. Two cases dealing with jurisdiction
were decided that term. Tranchemontagne dealt with the concept of
concurrent jurisdiction — that is, with the question of how to decide
which administrative decision-making body should take subject matter
jurisdiction when more than one decision-maker can theoretically receive
the matter and none exhibits express legislative indications of exclusivity.
The second, Concordia University, revisited the debates surrounding
exclusive jurisdiction and the use of the Weber test. Concordia University
is significant because it shows two decision-making fora, each with
elements of exclusivity, pitted against each other: labour arbitration and
class-action proceedings of the Superior Court.
1. Tranchemontagne v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support
Program)
At issue in Tranchemontagne was whether the Social Benefits Tribunal
(“SBT”) of Ontario had jurisdiction to determine that a provision of one
of its enabling statutes was inconsistent with the Ontario Human Rights
Code and therefore inapplicable. In addition to questions of concurrent
jurisdiction, Tranchemontagne also raised the question of the extent to
which the principles in the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision of Martin,
which allowed tribunals to decide that provisions of their enabling statutes
were unconstitutional under the Charter and decline to apply them, could
be extended to the realm of quasi-constitutional enactments.
39
See Laverne Jacobs, “Developments in Administrative Law: The 2004-2005 Term”
(2005) 30 S.C.L.R. (2d) 43.
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Robert Tranchemontagne and Norman Werbeski applied for income
support under the Ontario Disability Support Program Act, 1997
(“ODSPA”)40 in 1998 and 1999 respectively. The ODSPA provides income
support payments to individuals with disabilities. However, section 5(2)
of the ODSPA precludes eligibility for support if the applicant is addicted
to alcohol.41 At first instance, the applications of Mr. Tranchemontagne
and Mr. Werbeski were considered by the Director of the Ontario Disability
Support Program42 who concluded that the applicants had an addiction
to alcohol and were therefore not eligible for income support.
Tranchemontagne and Werbeski appealed this decision to the Social
Benefits Tribunal. Before the tribunal, they argued that subsection 5(2)
of the ODSPA contravened the Ontario Human Rights Code (“Code”) 43
because alcoholism was a form of disability. They argued that subsection
5(2) was therefore contrary to section 1 of the Code which provides that
“every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to services,
goods and facilities, without discrimination because of ... disability”.
Given that subsection 47(2) of the Code indicates that the Code has
primacy if there is a conflict between it and any other Act or regulation,44
the applicants contended that the SBT should find that subsection 5(2)
of the ODSPA was of no effect. The SBT did not decide the question as
it held that it did not have jurisdiction to apply the Human Rights Code
in a way that rendered provisions of its enabling statutes inoperable.
On appeal to the Ontario Divisional Court, the decision of the SBT
was upheld.45 In brief, oral reasons, the Court held that a tribunal must
40

S.O. 1997, c. 25, Sch. B.
Subsection 5(2) of the ODSPA states:
5(2) A person is not eligible for income support if,
(a) the person is dependent on or addicted to alcohol, a drug or some other chemically
active substance;
(b) the alcohol, drug or other substance has not been authorized by prescription as
provided for in the regulations; and
(c) the only substantial restriction in activities of daily living is attributable to the use or
cessation of use of the alcohol, drug or other substance at the time of determining
or reviewing eligibility.
42
See ss. 14(1) of the regulations under the ODSPA, O. Reg. 222/98, as am.
43
R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 [hereinafter “Code”].
44
Unless the Act or regulation states specifically that it is to apply irrespective of the Code.
Subsection 47(2) of the Code reads:
47(2) Where a provision in an Act or regulation purports to require or authorize
conduct that is a contravention of Part I, this Act applies and prevails unless the Act or
regulation specifically provides that it is to apply despite this Act.
45
See Werbeski v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program), [2003] O.J. No. 1409
(Div. Ct.).
41
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find its jurisdiction in its enabling legislation and is limited by its
enabling legislation. In the Court’s opinion, the two statutes specifying
the jurisdiction of the SBT — namely, the ODSPA and the Ontario Works
Act, 1997 (“OWA”)46 — did not grant it jurisdiction to decide the issue
of the Code’s paramountcy. The Court maintained that while the Tribunal
could use the Ontario Human Rights Code to interpret its legislation,
it could not find authority in the Code to ignore its enabling legislation.
As part of its reasons for dismissing the appeal, the Court held that there
was no evidence indicating that the Social Benefits Tribunal had the
expertise to address human rights issues. The Court asserted that the issue
of whether alcoholism was a disability and whether, by virtue of the Code,
subsection 5(2) should be held inoperable “should be determined by a
court or other tribunal with jurisdiction, expertise and procedure sufficient
to develop a full record and analysis to adequately address the issue”.47
Moreover, the tribunal’s procedures did not appear to be appropriate for
resolving such issues.
Messrs. Werbeski and Tranchemontagne appealed to the Ontario Court
of Appeal48 where their appeal was once again dismissed. In expansive
reasons, the Court of Appeal offered a two-part analysis. First, the Court
determined that the tribunal had implicit jurisdiction to decide questions
of law and that this jurisdiction included the power to decide matters
that fall under the Human Rights Code. In this regard, the Court of Appeal
was extending the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Martin.
Martin had held that tribunals with express or implied jurisdiction to decide
questions of law also have the jurisdiction to decide Charter matters,
unless that power has been excluded by the legislature. Interestingly, the
Court of Appeal offered no explicit reasons to explain its application of
the principles relating to the Charter developed in Martin to the quasiconstitutional domain (i.e., to the Code). Second, the Court of Appeal found
that despite the tribunal’s implied power to consider issues under the
Code, the tribunal had acted appropriately in declining this jurisdiction.
In the Court of Appeal’s view, the Ontario Human Rights Commission
was a more appropriate forum for resolving the dispute. This part of the
Court’s reasoning was based on its analysis of Quebec (Commission des
droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Quebec (Attorney
46
47
48

(C.A.).

S.O. 1997, c. 25, Sch. A.
See Werbeski, supra, note 45, at para. 6.
See Werbeski v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program), [2004] O.J. No. 3724
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General) (“Morin”)49 and Quebec (Attorney General) v. Quebec (Human
Rights Tribunal) (“Charette”),50 two key decisions on jurisdiction that
the Supreme Court had decided around the time of the Court of Appeal
decision. In Morin and Charette, the Supreme Court of Canada had
taken into consideration which tribunal was the “best fit” as part of its
determination of which tribunal should have jurisdiction.51 In both Morin
and Charette, a human rights tribunal was one of the bodies before
which the litigant wished to present its complaint. Although these two
cases differed from Tranchemontagne in that they dealt with competing
administrative regimes where one regime had a legislative claim to
exclusive jurisdiction, the Court of Appeal did not seem to take this into
consideration.
The arrival of the appeal before the Supreme Court therefore left
one wondering about the narrow issue of whether the SBT had the power
to consider the human rights question and whether it had the ability to
decline its jurisdiction as the Ontario Court of Appeal had determined.
Most importantly, however, for many seeking more concrete guidance
for determining matters of exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction after
the 2004-2005 term, one also wondered about the proper application,
if any, of Morin and Charette to the present appeal, as this was the first
time that the Supreme Court was faced with deciding which of two
administrative bodies with concurrent jurisdiction over a matter should
take jurisdiction (as opposed to deciding between two decision-making
fora, where one of the two appeared to have exclusive jurisdiction).
The majority of the Supreme Court held that the SBT had jurisdiction
to decide the human rights matter and that it erred by not doing so. The
case was remitted to the SBT to rule on the applicability of subsection
5(2) of the ODSPA. The majority judges were represented by McLachlin
C.J., Binnie, Bastarache and Fish JJ., with reasons written by Bastarache J.
The dissenting opinion by LeBel, Deschamps and Abella JJ., was penned
by Abella J.
(a) The Majority
Writing for the majority, Bastarache J. viewed the issue in
Tranchemontagne as being whether the SBT is obligated to follow
49
50
51

[2004] S.C.J. No. 34, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 185 [hereinafter “Morin”].
[2004] S.C.J. No. 35, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 223 [hereinafter “Charette”].
An in-depth discussion of Morin and Charette can be found in Jacobs, supra, note 39.
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provincial human rights legislation in rendering its decisions.52 He followed
this general statement with two specific sub-issues, namely, (1) whether
the SBT has the jurisdiction to consider the Code in rendering its decisions;
and (2) whether, if the SBT does indeed have jurisdiction to consider the
Code, it should have declined to exercise its jurisdiction in the present case.
Justice Bastarache began his analysis by examining the legislation
in question. He started with the enabling statutes of the SBT — the
ODSPA and the OWA. Applying the principles developed in Martin,
Bastarache J. determined that the SBT was empowered to decide questions
of law. For Bastarache J., a main indication of this was that the ODSPA
provides for an appeal on questions of law from the SBT to the Divisional
Court. This power was also evident from the nature of the questions that
the tribunal was required to determine in the course of its work, such
as the legal meaning of the expressions “substantial physical or mental
impairment” and “chemically active substance”. As held in Martin, if an
administrative body is empowered to decide questions of law, there is a
presumption that it can go beyond its enabling statute and decide issues
of common law or statutory interpretation so long as those legal questions
arise in the course of a case that is properly before it. Justice Bastarache
stressed quite heavily that what the tribunal was being asked to do in
this case was not analogous to constitutional invalidation. Constitutional
invalidation — e.g., subjecting a provision to Charter scrutiny — requires
a tribunal to have the power to decide questions of law in relation to the
particular provision at issue. In this case, Bastarache J. asserted, the SBT
was being asked merely to apply an external statute. It did not matter if its
consideration of the external source might render a provision inapplicable.
This distinction was central to Bastarache J.’s analysis. In Bastarache
J.’s opinion, the necessity for a tribunal to consider external sources of
law rests simply on the importance of well-informed decisions and the
reality that a complete legal answer may not necessarily be found solely
in a tribunal’s enabling statute.
The respondent argued that the ODSPA and the OWA restricted the
tribunal’s power to determine questions of law so that it could not
determine matters under the Code. In particular, subsection 29(3) of the
ODSPA prevented the tribunal from making decisions on appeal that the
Director could not have made in the first instance. The respondent argued
that since the Director could not possibly use the Code to deny an
application under the ODSPA (and it is unclear how the respondent came
52

Tranchemontagne, supra, note 4.
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to this conclusion), the tribunal also did not have the authority to consider
the Code. In rejecting the respondent’s argument, Bastarache J. drew a
conceptual distinction between a “decision” and a “power” of the tribunal.
In his view, subsection 29(3) dealt only with decisions, yet, using the Code
to inform an eligibility determination was not a decision but simply a
power that the tribunal may possess. Moreover, Bastarache J. observed
that the ODSPA speaks of powers possessed by the SBT but not the
Director. The possibility that the SBT may consider the Code was therefore
not caught or precluded by subsection 29(3).
The respondent argued further that subsection 67(2) of the OWA,
which provides that the SBT cannot determine the constitutional validity
of a provision or regulation,53 prevented the SBT from considering the
Code. This seemed to be a stronger argument for the respondent. Justice
Bastarache interpreted the respondent’s argument as premised on the
idea that the scrutiny required to determine if a provision is discriminatory
and therefore inapplicable under the Code is analogous to the kind of
scrutiny required to examine the constitutional validity of a provision.
However, he did not find this analogy tenable.
Justice Bastarache observed that the primacy provision of the Code
has both similarities and differences to section 52 of the Constitution.
Both serve to eliminate the effects of inconsistent legislation with the
result that the impugned provision will not be followed and, for the
purposes of that particular application, it is as if the legislation had never
been in effect. Yet, Bastarache J. found that differences between the
primacy provisions of the Code and the Constitution were far more
important than the similarities. As Bastarache J. put it:
... it is one thing to preclude a statutory tribunal from invalidating
legislation enacted by the legislature that created it. It is completely
different to preclude that body from applying legislation enacted by
that legislature in order to resolve apparent conflicts between statutes.54

Justice Bastarache held that a declaration of invalidity under the
Constitution implies that the impugned provision had not been enacted
validly. Section 52 of the Constitution basically indicates that the legislature
53

Subsection 67(2) of the OWA also states that the tribunal cannot determine the legislative
authority for making a regulation. This section reads:
67(2)The Tribunal shall not inquire into or make a decision concerning,
(a) the constitutional validity of a provision of an Act or a regulation; or
(b) the legislative authority for a regulation made under an Act.
54
Tranchemontagne, supra, note 4, at para. 31.
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had no authority to pass the provision in question. By contrast, section
47 of the Code does not require the decision-making body to make any
statement regarding the provision’s validity. Section 47 implies that the
legislature had the power to enact the impugned provision; an issue only
arises because the legislature also enacted another law that takes precedence
over the impugned provision. Put another way, the analysis under section
47 of the Code does not require a tribunal or court to “look behind the law”
to consider a provision’s validity. The tribunal or court is not declaring
that the legislature was wrong to enact the section in the first place. In
Bastarache J.’s view, when a tribunal or court applies section 47 of the
Code, “it is simply applying the tie-breaker supplied by, and amended
according to the desires of, the legislature itself”.55
The respondent’s final argument was based on the similarity between
section 1 of the Code and section 15 of the Charter. The respondent
argued that if an issue should be carved out of the tribunal’s jurisdiction
because it is sufficiently complex to be a Charter issue, the same issue
could also be carved out of the tribunal’s jurisdiction for constituting an
issue under the Code. This argument was also dismissed by Bastarache J.
He held that asking the tribunal to determine if a question was really a
Charter question forced the tribunal to engage in a very complex analysis.
At the heart of this complex analysis would be the issue of whether
the Charter should apply followed by an inquiry into the comparative
advantages of using the Code over the Charter. In Bastarache J.’s opinion,
if one is to reason that the tribunal has been prevented from dealing with
the Charter because Charter issues are complex, it is hard to maintain
simultaneously that the legislature has conferred upon the tribunal the
necessity to enter into a similarly complex analysis in order to determine
its own jurisdiction.56
In place of the respondent’s arguments, Bastarache J. put forth two
reasons of his own to support the conclusion that the tribunal has
jurisdiction under the Code despite its lack of jurisdiction under the
Constitution. First, he pointed out that the legislature had not only indicated
that the Code is to have primacy but had also provided instructions for
how the application of the Code could be avoided. In particular, the
Code is to apply unless another Act or regulation has provided expressly
that it is to apply despite the Code. This is the only way that the Code’s

55
56

Id., at para. 36.
Id., at para. 37.
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primacy could be disrupted. The legislature did not use this method with
respect to the SBT.
Second, Bastarache J. discussed the non-exclusive jurisdiction of
the Ontario Human Rights Commission. He noted that while at one time
exclusive jurisdiction had been given to human rights boards of inquiry
to determine contraventions under the Code, the legislature had since
altered its regime, allowing for concurrent jurisdiction between the Human
Rights Commission and other decision-making bodies. He also noted
that the Ontario Human Rights Commission could decline jurisdiction
where the matter would be best adjudicated by another decision-making
regime.57 Under the current version of the Human Rights Code, there is
therefore no requirement that human rights matters go through the Human
Rights Commission process. Moreover, Bastarache J. referred to Parry
Sound (District) Social Services Administration Board v. O.P.S.E.U.,
Local 32458 and Charette for the proposition that human rights legislation
be determined through a collection of administrative actors in order to
foster a general culture of respect for human rights in the administrative
justice system.
Justice Bastarache finished his decision by turning his attention to
whether the tribunal should have declined to exercise its jurisdiction in
this case. The respondent argued that in cases where it is possible for
two administrative bodies to have jurisdiction over an issue, the decision
regarding which should have jurisdiction should hinge in part on an
analysis of which of the two bodies would offer a better forum for resolving
the dispute. Justice Bastarache noted that the respondent’s argument sought
to apply the approach developed for cases of exclusive jurisdiction to
cases of concurrent jurisdiction as well. Justice Bastarache held that, in
order for the respondent’s argument to succeed, it would be important
for the legislature to have granted the SBT the power to decline jurisdiction
once seized of the matter. However, through an examination of the
enabling statutes of the SBT and by comparison to other regimes in
which the legislature had provided a court or administrative body the
discretion to decline to hear an issue, Bastarache J. determined that the
legislature had not granted this power to the SBT. This was enough to
decide the appeal.
Yet, although the lack of statutory power to decline jurisdiction was
enough to determine the matter, Bastarache J. went on to comment on
57
58

Code, supra, note 43, s. 34(1)(a).
[2003] S.C.J. No. 42, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 157 [hereinafter “Parry Sound”].
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the salutary aspects of having the SBT decide both the social benefit and
human rights issues. He was very quick to stress, however, that despite
the coincidence that the SBT happened to be the best forum in this case,
the appropriateness of the tribunal was in no way determinative of its
jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of administrative tribunals derives solely from
legislative intent and has no regard to factors like expertise and practical
constraints.
Nevertheless, as for the salutary effects of the SBT, Bastarache J.
was of the opinion that the SBT was the best place to resolve the question
of discrimination and whether section 5(2) of the ODSPA should be
applicable. He noted that it is almost inescapable that applicants who have
been denied financial assistance under the ODSPA will find themselves
before the SBT. Pursuing alternate routes such as the process under the
Human Rights Code may not be feasible in terms of time or resources.
There was also no guarantee that the applicants’ concern would be heard
by the Human Rights Tribunal. Justice Bastarache took into account that
litigation concerns such as this one could involve a long process during
which the applicants would receive no benefits. Overall, Bastarache J.’s
reasons centred on the need to avoid creating barriers to human rights
remedies, especially when dealing with vulnerable litigants.
In completing his discussion, Bastarache J. offered some cautionary
advice to tribunals. He asserted that when an administrative tribunal is
properly seized of an issue by way of statutory appeal, and particularly
an appeal in which a vulnerable applicant is attempting to defend his or
her human rights, it would be rare for that tribunal not be the most
appropriate forum to hear the entire dispute. Indeed, Bastarache J. went
further, virtually closing the door to the possibility of a tribunal ever
passing off the human rights arguments to another forum. He stated:
I am unable to think of any situation where such a tribunal would be
justified in ignoring the human rights argument, applying a potentially
discriminatory provision, referring the legislative challenge to another
forum, and leaving the appellant without benefits in the meantime.59

Finally, Bastarache J. offered a warning to tribunals that may be
tempted to argue that their practical constraints (such as efficiency) will
prevent them from taking on matters outside of their direct expertise. In
Bastarache J.’s opinion, a tribunal ought not avoid cases because they
have assumed that the legislature did not provide them with sufficient
59
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tools for determining the issues. Stated flatly, tribunals cannot ignore
matters that the legislature intended them to consider if the legislature
has not granted them the power to decline jurisdiction.
(b) The Dissent
Similar to Bastarache J., Abella J. made an effort to draw away all
of the humanitarian aspects of this case in order to reveal it as strictly a
case of statutory interpretation. In Abella J.’s words, Tranchemontagne
“is not about access, about the applicability of human rights legislation,
or about whether the government is entitled to refuse to provide disability
benefits to individuals whose only substantial impairment is an alcohol
or drug dependency. It is about the scope of the legislature’s intention when
it enacted a statutory provision depriving an administrative tribunal of
jurisdiction to decide whether any of its enabling provisions were ultra
vires or violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms”.60 More
particularly, for Abella J., this case sought to determine in which forum
a party could legally bring a challenge about the compliance of the ODSPA
with the Code and whether such a challenge could be made before the
Director of the Disability Support Program and/or the SBT.61 However,
unlike the majority, the dissenting judges were of the opinion that the
ODSPA’s provision prohibiting the SBT from determining the constitutional
validity of its enabling legislation also prevented the tribunal from
determining the compliance of its enabling statutes with the Code.
Generally, the dissent’s reasons were based on an idea drawn from Martin
that the legislature may intend to exclude a broad category of legal
questions from the scope of issues that can be addressed by a tribunal.62
The points of difference between Abella and Bastarache JJ. present
quite a stark contrast. Indeed, Abella J.’s dissent focuses on three distinct
aspects of the case: (i) the nature of subsection 47(2) of the Code; (ii) the
reason for enactment of subsection 67(2) of the OWA (prohibiting
consideration of constitutional validity); and (iii) practical considerations
60
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rebutting the presumption that the SBT could determine the operability
of provisions in its enabling legislation.
As to the nature of subsection 47(2) of the Code, the dissenting judges
saw this provision as one that promoted the values and rights expressed
in the Code as being fundamental in nature. They pointed out that
subsection 47(2) of the Code does not confer jurisdiction on any decisionmaker — it does nothing more than announce the primacy of the Code.
Subsection 47(2) assumes that when a body with the authority to make
decisions regarding the Code is asked to apply it, it will conduct its task so
that the Human Rights Code prevails over any other inconsistent statutory
provision. The section outlining the Code’s primacy is therefore only of
interpretive assistance; it is not meant to grant jurisdiction to any particular
decision-making body as the majority would maintain.63
Justice Abella also discussed the reason why the section prohibiting
the tribunal from considering the constitutional validity of a provision or
the legislative authority of a regulation was enacted. She noted that this
provision, subsection 67(2), was enacted after a former version of the
SBT had granted itself jurisdiction to decide Charter matters through an
interpretation of its legislation.64 Justice Abella looked at the provision
broadly. In her view, it was clear that the primary legislative aim in creating
subsection 67(2) was that the legislature did not want the SBT to be able
to refuse to apply provisions of its enabling statute by finding them to be
inoperable. She asserted that if one accepts this legislative aim, then it
becomes difficult to accept the majority’s opinion that the SBT can render
provisions of its enabling statute inoperable through the interpretation of
some legislation, like the Code, but not through the interpretation of others
such as the Constitution.65
What is the difference between a tribunal rendering a provision
constitutionally invalid and therefore inoperable under the Constitution
on the one hand, and rendering a provision inapplicable by a quasiconstitutional enactment, on the other? Justice Bastarache put heavy stock
in this distinction but, on close analysis, the distinction is very hard to
maintain. Justice Abella brought this question to the fore in her decision.
She challenged that tribunals had never had the power to declare legislation
invalid under the principles in Martin, but had been given only the
jurisdiction to decline to apply a provision. Therefore, the majority’s
63
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suggestion that the prohibition set out in subsection 67(2) does not extend
to finding inoperability under the Code because the remedies under the
Charter and Code are different, is difficult to sustain. Put another way,
whether the challenge is brought under the Charter or under the Code,
the only remedy that a tribunal can offer is to refuse to apply the impugned
provision. To bring an additional element into the equation — namely,
that the tribunal’s analysis under the Charter requires a determination of
invalidity — does not make the argument stronger in favour of the
tribunal’s ability to decide matters under the Code.
Referring to the principles set out in Martin, Abella J. looked also
for any practical reasons why the tribunal should not be able to determine
Code issues. In terms of the SBT’s institutional characteristics, she found
that neither the Director nor the SBT had the capacity to decide complex,
time-consuming legal issues. For example, the Director does not hold
hearings or receive evidence beyond what is filed by the applicant.
(This presumably speaks to the impossibility of having broader public
participation in the decision-making process through interveners, etc.)
Similarly, the SBT’s process is informal and private with hearings that
last no longer than 1 1/2 hours. Moreover, Abella J. noted the SBT’s
backlog of cases in the year that Mr. Tranchemontagne and Mr. Werbeski’s
applications had been submitted.
It was obvious that asking the SBT to consider Code compliance
would have an impact on its ability to fulfil its responsibility to ensure
the payment of monetary benefits. The SBT would also not have the
expertise to deal with complex and nuanced human rights determinations,
unlike the Human Rights Commission. Moreover, unlike the statutory
human rights regime, the disability benefits process does not provide the
checks and balances to protect the integrity of the Code, the integrity of
human rights adjudication, the interests of the public and that of the parties.
Finally, Abella J. noted the express commentary made in the Legislative
Assembly of Ontario during second reading of the OWA, indicating that
constitutional questions were removed from the SBT’s jurisdiction because
they are complex legal issues, with potentially far-reaching consequences
that the legislators believed to be better addressed by the courts.
(i) Commentary
What is striking about the decision in Tranchemontagne is that both
the majority and the dissent take a postural stance of deference to the
legislature and classify their approach as pure statutory interpretation.
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Yet, the two interpretive methods used are vastly different. One is tempted
to classify the majority’s approach as formalist and the minority’s approach
as functionalist. For the majority, pure statutory interpretation is an exercise
of interpreting the Code and enabling statutes of the SBT. This exercise
leads ultimately to the question of how to understand the provision of the
Code asserting its primacy. The majority view is that primacy implies
jurisdiction to give effect to this primacy on the part of any administrative
body faced with a question that could fall under the Human Rights Code.
Moreover, the majority comes to this conclusion, as Abella J. notes,
despite the fact that there is no explicit indication in the statute that any
other body should have jurisdiction under the Code and, arguably, despite
clear indications in the statutes and elsewhere that Code issues were to
be excluded from the jurisdiction of the social benefits process. This
conclusion is not entirely convincing.
As for the dissenting judges, inspiring their analysis from the
methodology set out in Martin allows them to infuse their statutory
interpretation with the practical considerations that are so compelling in
this case. Yet, like the majority, the dissenting judges also try to focus
solely on interpretation and remove all humanitarian aspects.
However, with respect to both the majority and the dissent, trying to
remove the issues in Tranchemontagne from its larger contextual aspect
and placing it uniquely within a quest to validate legislative intent is
problematic in itself. The decision leaves unaddressed and unanswered
perennial problems such as administrative backlog, lack of resources
and training, and decisions that are to be determined by decision-making
bodies without the expertise in human rights to handle them. If the
decisions on jurisdiction in the 2004-2005 term showed a battle between
expert decision-making and expediency (i.e., having all legal questions
decided in one forum) in which expediency was gaining ground, the
2005-2006 term showed the triumph of neither. Some have argued that
it would be useful for the concept of the rule of law to be used to bring
about change to the administrative inefficiencies of the system.66 While
this is a progressive idea, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision on
access to justice and rule of law decided in the 2005-2006 term,67 it does
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not seem that these fundamental concepts are gaining as much leverage
as they could at the court.
Moreover, although “pure statutory interpretation” is the stated objective
of the majority approach, there is still much “impure non-statutory”
discussion that circulates in Tranchemontagne. Unlike past years, the Court
is very clear to state in its decision that it is relegating this discussion to
a non-determinative realm. Yet, it is hard for the reader to ignore the
human aspects of this case and the elements of administrative efficiency
when they are nevertheless brought into the text. They are in some ways
the most compelling aspects of the case and certainly do not become
less so by the way in which they are introduced into the decision. For
example, Bastarache J. began this discussion with a bit of legislative,
factual and contextual history. He noted that it had been almost five years
since Mr. Tranchemontagne and Mr. Werbeski were denied income support
payments by the director. He further recognized the human aspect of the
case by stating that if the appellants were ultimately successful in proving
discrimination, they would have lived five years without the assistance
they were owed. He further stated that no amount of interest could negate
this fact. Justice Bastarache acknowledged as well that it is important that
the Social Benefits Tribunal operate efficiently: it would be unfortunate
to place interpretive demands on the tribunal if these demands resulted
in slowing down the application process for the great bulk of applicants.
However, whereas in past years, where the exclusive and concurrent
jurisdiction cases were unclear about how such policy concerns should
fit into the overall analysis to determine the appropriate jurisdiction,
Bastarache J. is quick to clarify their place in Tranchemontagne. These
considerations of practicality for the applicants and the efficient machinery
of tribunal decision-making are to take second place to the pure pursuit of
legislative intent. Justice Bastarache held: “Ultimately, ... this appeal
is not decided by matters of practicality for applicants or matters of
expediency for administrative tribunals. It is decided by following the
statutory scheme enacted by the legislature.” Once again, as in the 20042005 term, we are in a situation where the objective is to pursue legislative
intent. But, whether in practice, legislative intent removed from all other
considerations can be the sole guide for deciding matters of jurisdiction
will remain debatable questions within the legal and tribunal communities.
Nonetheless, Bastarache J.’s commentary on the significance of
practical considerations in decisions regarding concurrent jurisdiction is
useful. It provides more explicit guidance on the theoretical place of
practical and policy considerations, such as lack of resources by a tribunal
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to determine human rights matters and the desirability of asking potentially
vulnerable applicants to bring their matters in two distinct fora, in
determining questions of jurisdiction. Unlike the cases of exclusive
jurisdiction from the 2004-2005 term, where policy considerations were
brought into the discussion but where the Court was less clear in outlining
the weight and value that these considerations should have in an analysis
of determining the proper forum, the majority in Tranchemontagne
points out firmly that policy considerations are not to be determinative at
all of which of two potentially concurrent bodies should have jurisdiction
over an issue. As Bastarache J. points out, if the matter has been brought
properly before an administrative decision-maker, the question of whether
it should transfer the matter to another administrative decision-maker is
answered primarily by seeing if there are legislative indications that
the matter is to be transferred, including a statutory power to decline
jurisdiction by the body that has been seized of the matter.
The majority also declares different approaches for concurrent
and exclusive jurisdiction. It would appear that when a case deals with
concurrent jurisdiction between administrative bodies, the question of
whether one body represents a more appropriate forum than another is not
a valid one. The answer to the jurisdiction question stems solely from an
analysis of the relevant legislation. With respect to exclusive jurisdiction,
the methodological analysis is quite different. When the issue is which
of two bodies should have jurisdiction over matter and one body has an
exclusivity clause (or has implied exclusivity over the matter), the analysis
involved is the search for the “essential character” of the dispute. While
the question of which forum is most appropriate may arise, asking the
question explicitly may not always be relevant. The next case, Concordia
University, shows the discussion of appropriateness implicit in the analysis
of the essential character. Concordia University is also an interesting
case because it is a decision in which both possible fora had elements of
exclusivity.
2. Bisaillon v. Concordia University
Concordia University is the only case decided by the Supreme Court
of Canada in the past two terms that deals with exclusive jurisdiction.
This is quite a contrast to the 2004-2005 term where the Court spent a
significant amount of energy on the question of exclusive jurisdiction.
The cases of 2004-2005 were the first in almost a decade to advance
vigorously the principles of methodology to be used in determining which
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of competing decision-making bodies (including at times the courts) should
have jurisdiction when one body could make a claim to exclusivity.
Concordia University moves the discussion a step further. It addresses
the exclusive jurisdiction of labour arbitrators in a case that pits them
against the exclusive jurisdiction of the superior courts to take on class
action suits. The result is a case that pushes forward the boundaries of
not only jurisdiction in the administrative law context of labour law
but simultaneously provides guiding principles on class action suits and
civil procedure.
At issue in Concordia University was whether a unionized employee
of the university could institute a class action against the university in
order to contest certain decisions that the university had made with
respect to the administration and use of a supplemental pension plan.
In particular, Mr. Bisaillon alleged that the university had used the
funds inappropriately in order to pay for contribution holidays, cover
administrative costs and to finance early retirement packages. The pension
plan had been established by Concordia University for its employees
and had more than 4,100 members. Over 80 per cent of the members
were unionized employees covered by nine collective agreements that
Concordia had concluded with its nine certified unions. In each of the
nine collective agreements, there was direct or indirect reference to the
pension plan.
By instituting a class action, Mr. Bisaillon hoped to obtain a declaration
that the changes that the university had made to the plan were null. He
also sought to compel Concordia to pay back the money it had taken
from the pension fund. Eight of the unions supported and financed Mr.
Bisaillon’s attempt to institute a class action. The ninth union, CUFA,
agreed to the changes made by the university. CUFA and Concordia
University therefore opposed Mr. Bisaillon’s application for a class
action suit.
In the Québec Superior Court, CUFA, supported by Concordia,
submitted that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to authorize a class
action as the dispute dealt with collective bargaining and the implementation
of the collective agreement. Because these matters lay within the exclusive
domain of the certified unions, CUFA and Concordia argued that Mr.
Bisaillon was bound to use the grievance procedure in order to attempt
to resolve any disputes with Concordia regarding the plan.
The Superior Court agreed with this. They allowed the request for
declinatory exception sought by CUFA and Concordia and dismissed
Mr. Bisaillon’s motion. The Superior Court held that the disputes dealt
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with the application of the collective agreement since the pension plan
was a benefit within it. As such, based on the Supreme Court decision in
Weber v. Ontario Hydro,68 the Court held that the question lay within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the labour arbitrators appointed under the
collective agreement.69 The Superior Court noted also that Mr. Bisaillon
did not have rights that were distinct from the collective agreement and
that Mr. Bisaillon had conceded that his class action was part of a
negotiation strategy with the eight unions which, collectively, were
trying to negotiate improvements to the pension plan.
On appeal to the Québec Court of Appeal, the decision of the Québec
Superior Court was overturned. The Court of Appeal found that the
pension plan existed independently of any collective agreement. In the
Court’s opinion, the case had nothing to do with the collective agreement
that applied to Mr. Bisaillon and therefore did not fall within the jurisdiction
of the grievance arbitrator. Moreover, the Court expressed concern that
not one grievance arbitrator would have authority to hear all the claims
raised in the class action. He or she would only be able to hear the
claims of those who fell within the collective agreement over which he
or she had jurisdiction. The result of leaving the matter to grievance
arbitration was the possibility of several contradictory decisions stemming
from the decisions of many arbitrators. The Court of Appeal held that the
best result was for the Superior Court to exercise its residual jurisdiction
to authorize a class action suit.70
The narrow issue before the Supreme Court was therefore whether
a class action suit was appropriate in this case or whether grievance
arbitration was the correct forum. Determining this issue, however, required
the Court to revisit and expand upon the principles relating to exclusive
jurisdiction that they had set out in Weber and developed most recently in
Morin and Charette. Concordia University is also of particular importance
because it brings the notion of in personam jurisdiction to the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence on exclusive jurisdiction. The Court held that
grievance arbitration was the correct forum for this dispute. However,
there was a narrow split of 4-3 among the justices of the Supreme Court of
Canada. Justices LeBel, Deschamps, Abella and Charron were the four
judges who formed the majority. Their reasons were written by LeBel J.
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The dissenting reasons of McLachlin C.J., Bastarache and Binnie JJ. were
penned by Bastarache J.
(a) Majority
Justice LeBel framed the issue in Concordia University as being
whether a class action suit could be used to bypass the representation and
grievance resolution mechanisms that had been established within Québec
labour law. Justice LeBel approached the analysis of this question by
looking at four distinct aspects of the legal framework governing the issue:
the nature of the class action suit, the collective representation system in
Québec labour law, the jurisdiction of grievance arbitrators and the
statutory framework governing supplemental pension plans.
With respect to the nature of class action suits, over which the Québec
Superior Court has exclusive jurisdiction, LeBel J. noted that although
legislation on class actions should be construed flexibly and generously,
class actions are a procedural vehicle that cannot modify or create
substantive rights. In other words, a class action proceeding does not
provide parties with a legal proceeding that they would not otherwise have
on an individual basis. Moreover, the legal rules governing who has
subject matter jurisdiction are not changed by the choice of procedure.
Using a class action procedure does not have the effect of granting
jurisdiction on the Superior Court when the subject matter would otherwise
fall within the jurisdiction of another court or tribunal.
As for collective representation, LeBel J. outlined some basic concepts.
He pointed out that the Québec Labour Code71 gives certified unions a
set of rights. The most important of these rights is the monopoly of
representation. A certified union has the exclusive power to negotiate
conditions of employment for all members of the bargaining unit. Once
the collective agreement has been put in place, the union also has exclusive
representation of rights with respect to its implementation and application.
The union’s monopoly on representation has significant impact on
employee rights. For example, employees are precluded from negotiating
their individual conditions of employment directly with their employer.
In return, employees improve their position vis-à-vis the employer, which
usually has the greater balance of power. They also reap greater protection
of their interests. The employer is also affected by the union’s monopoly
of representation. On the one hand, the employer becomes obliged to
71
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enter into good-faith collective bargaining with the union. On the other, the
employer derives various benefits, such as the right to peace and stability
in the workplace and an expectation that disagreements stemming from
the collective agreement will be negotiated with the union or settled
through the grievance arbitration process.
Justice LeBel pointed out that there are two faces of a grievance
arbitrator’s jurisdiction. The first is subject matter jurisdiction which
includes the power to grant an appropriate remedy. A pre-condition to
exercising subject matter jurisdiction is that the grievance arbitrator have
jurisdiction over the “essential subject matter of the dispute” so that he
or she can grant an appropriate remedy. Justice LeBel referred to the
analytical approach adopted by the Supreme Court in Weber which held
that a grievance arbitrator has exclusive jurisdiction when “the dispute,
in its essential character, arises from the interpretation, application,
administration or violation of the collective agreement”72 Identifying the
essential character of a dispute is an exercise that involves taking into
account all the facts surrounding the dispute between the parties. Once
the factual context has been determined, it must be examined to see
whether the collective agreement explicitly or implicitly applies to it.
Referring to cases such as Regina Police Assn. Inc. v. Regina (City)
Board of Police Commissioners;73 Parry Sound (District) Social
Services Administration Board v. O.P.S.E.U., Local 324;74 and St. Anne
Nackawic Pulp & Paper Co. v. Canadian Paper Workers Union, Local
219,75 LeBel J. stressed that the Supreme Court has repeatedly given
grievance arbitrators generous exclusive jurisdiction over issues related
to conditions of employment so long as there is some connection to the
collective agreement. He held:
This Court has considered the subject-matter jurisdiction of grievance
arbitrators on several occasions, and it has clearly adopted a liberal
position according to which grievance arbitrators have a broad exclusive
jurisdiction over issues relating to conditions of employment, provided
that those conditions can be shown to have an express or implicit
connection to the collective agreement…76
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Using this as a springboard, LeBel J. reasoned that the provisions of
the collective agreement relating to pension plans could also fall within
the exclusive jurisdiction of grievance arbitrators. He pointed out that the
Québec Court of Appeal had held arbitrators to have exclusive jurisdiction
over such issues on numerous occasions. He noted, as well, that there was
a recent trend in the Québec Court of Appeal to grant grievance arbitrators
exclusive jurisdiction even when there is no reference to the pension
plan in the collective agreement. He referred to two cases: Hydro-Québec
v. Corbeil;77 and Association provinciale des retraités d’Hydro-Québec v.
Hydro-Québec.78 In Corbeil, for instance, the Court found that the pension
plan formed part of the employee’s remuneration and conditions of
employment. As a consequence, it was held to be an integral part of the
collective agreement. In a similar vein, LeBel J. noted that commentators
on the issue have also argued that general clauses such as those recognizing
employers’ management rights could confer jurisdiction over issues dealing
with the application and implementation of benefits, including those in a
pension plan.
The second aspect of a grievance arbitrator’s jurisdiction is in
personam jurisdiction. In personam jurisdiction encapsulates the idea
that the arbitrator must have jurisdiction over the parties to the dispute.
If the collective agreement does not apply to parties bringing the claim,
then the arbitrator has no jurisdiction to hear the claim of those parties.
Justice LeBel indicated that the ordinary courts retain jurisdiction over a
dispute when grievance arbitrators lack jurisdiction. Issues of in personam
jurisdiction sometimes occur when third parties are involved. Arbitrators
do not have to ensure that their decisions will have no effect on third parties
as third parties who are affected by arbitration decisions will not be legally
bound by them. But, as LeBel J. asserted, “there is nothing to prevent
third parties from voluntarily and expressly submitting to a grievance
arbitrator’s jurisdiction, thereby bestowing jurisdiction upon him or her”.79
Justice LeBel finished his discussion on the jurisdiction of grievance
arbitrators with commentary on the residual jurisdiction of the Superior
Court. He repeated that in cases where a grievance arbitrator lacks the
authority to grant the remedy required to resolve the dispute, the courts
retain residual inherent jurisdiction. Justice LeBel asserted, however,
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that this special jurisdiction of the Superior Court was not an issue in the
present case.
Finally, LeBel J. analyzed statutory framework governing supplemental
pension plans. He noted that the administration and operation of pension
plans is overseen by the Régie des rentes du Québec, the governing body
that ensures compliance with the Supplemental Pension Plans Act.80
Justice LeBel noted that while the Régie des rentes is not a tribunal and
is not designed to resolve disagreements over the interpretation of pension
plans, it does establish a consensual arbitration process for certain disputes81
Justice LeBel pointed out that the case at bar was not covered by the
arbitral powers of the Régie des rentes.
In light of these general principles, LeBel J. asserted that Mr.
Bisaillon’s position “undermine[d] two pillars of our collective labour
relations system: the exclusivity of the arbitrator’s jurisdiction and the
collective representation system”.82 As for the exclusivity of the
arbitrator’s jurisdiction, LeBel J. criticized the Québec Court of Appeal
for adopting the wrong methodology and therefore reaching an incorrect
result. In his opinion, the Court of Appeal should have started its inquiry
by determining if a grievance arbitrator had jurisdiction to rule on the
individual proceeding between Mr. Bisaillon and Concordia. It should
have then considered the nature of the individual claims of the majority
of the group and the in personam jurisdiction of the arbitrator with
respect to those claims. Because the Court of Appeal did not do this, it
ended up removing individual proceedings over which the arbitrator had
jurisdiction from the grievance arbitration process to the Superior Court.
Yet, the Superior Court had no jurisdiction over the parties or the subject
matter and could not acquire jurisdiction simply because the motion for
class action had been filed. More generally, LeBel J. was of the view
that the Court of Appeal should not have focused as it did on
determining whether the grievance arbitrator had jurisdiction over every
potential member of the group covered by the class action.
Justice LeBel held that labour arbitrators would have exclusive
jurisdiction over the subject matter of this dispute. The facts of the case
dealt with unilateral amendments made by the university to the pension
80
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plan and their validity. Moreover, the collective agreement provisions
referred to the pension plan. In LeBel J.’s opinion, Mr. Bisaillon’s issues
were implicitly and perhaps even explicitly linked to the collective
agreements and their application. Finally, LeBel J. opined that a grievance
arbitrator would have the necessary jurisdiction to declare the employer’s
decision null and to issue an appropriate remedy. As such, this was not a
case in which the Superior Court could validly exercise its exceptional
residual jurisdiction. The Québec Superior Court was correct to declare
that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.
Justice LeBel finished his decision with comments on the problem
of potentially conflicting multiple decisions arising from arbitration
awards made in respect to the many bargaining units. LeBel J. held that
the possibility of conflicting decisions was not enough to justify a
conclusion that the Superior Court had jurisdiction instead of grievance
arbitrators. Justice LeBel wrote:
Although I am of the view that the trial judge correctly concluded
that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction in the instant case, I must
admit that this solution is not free of procedural difficulties, particularly
because of the multiplicity of possible proceedings and of potential
conflicts between separate arbitration awards in respect of the different
bargaining units. However, the potential difficulties are not sufficient
to justify referring the matter to the Superior Court and holding that it
has jurisdiction.83

In LeBel J.’s opinion, it had not been demonstrated that a real
possibility of chaos resulting from contradictory decisions could exist.
Justice LeBel theorized that there were various options under the rules of
labour law that could be used to prevent multiple arbitration proceedings.
For example, he indicated that many of the unions could decide to come
to an agreement with the employer to submit the various grievances to a
single arbitrator. He felt that this should have been the preferred approach
for all parties involved and that it would be difficult for the employer to
oppose this approach. Justice LeBel also noted that if one arbitrator
decided a grievance by one of the unions in favour of that union, all the
employees would benefit indirectly from the award. This is because all
the money wrongfully taken from the pension plan would be returned.
This was a point with which the dissenting judges took great issue.
Furthermore, in LeBel J.’s view, once one grievance had been decided, all
83
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the other grievances filed by the other unions would, in practice, become
moot. At worst, in the wake of contradictory or incompatible arbitration
awards, Concordia University could probably resolve any conflicts
by complying with the award least favourable to it. In sum, multiple
proceedings could be avoided by tools of civil procedure in addition to
tools of labour law. Moreover, LeBel J. did not see anything to infer that
holding labour arbitration as the appropriate forum would permit the
unions to benefit more greatly than the employer by encouraging them
to file multiple grievances and forcing the employer to abide by the award
most unfavourable to it.
(b) Dissent
Unlike the majority, the dissenting judges (McLachlin C.J.C.,
Bastarache and Binnie JJ.) held that labour arbitrators did not have
exclusive jurisdiction over Mr. Bisaillon’s claim. They held that the Québec
Superior Court had jurisdiction to entertain Mr. Bisaillon’s application
for a class action proceeding and that an application to the Québec Superior
Court was the only procedure available that could settle conclusively the
question of the university’s financing of the pension fund. In reaching
this conclusion, Bastarache J. for the dissent added that their decision
was not intended to indicate whether Mr. Bisaillon’s class action should
be certified or whether he had “sufficient interest” to proceed with the claim
without his union — these issues were for the Québec Superior Court to
decide.
Concordia University shows us an interesting change of roles in the
court. Chief Justice McLachlin and Bastarache and Binnie JJ. all held very
strong opinions in the cases on exclusive jurisdiction in the 2004-2005
term. In Concordia University they came together to counter the decision
of LeBel J. and the majority. The dissent in Concordia University centred
on two main points made by the majority: (a) whether there was a sufficient
nexus between the pension plan and the collective agreement to maintain
that the collective agreement was a valid source of the labour arbitrator’s
jurisdiction; and (b) the degree to which there was the possibility of
multiple incompatible arbitration decisions and the degree to which such
multiple proceedings could be problematic.
Justice Bastarache agreed with many aspects of LeBel J.’s decision.
However, he indicated that where he parted views with LeBel J. was with
respect to his conclusion. In Bastarache J.’s opinion, an analysis of the
facts of this case under the Weber principles did not lead to the conclusion
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that the pension dispute could be traced back to the collective agreement.
Indeed, a clear indication that Weber had been misapplied was that different
courts and arbitrators, all gaining jurisdiction from different collective
agreement and employment contracts, could come to mutually incompatible
positions on how the university should administer the plan. As Bastarache J.
put it:
With respect, however, I believe the risk of inconsistent decisions is
symptomatic of a misapplication of Weber. I cannot agree that Weber
allows for the same party to be bound by inconsistent directions from
different courts and arbitrators, all claiming — rightfully, according to
my colleague — to have jurisdiction over the essential character of the
dispute. The fact that this possibility exists here confirms that the
essential character of this appeal arises out of something other than the
collective agreement: the Plan itself.84

Justice Bastarache pointed out that there are limits to the idea that
labour arbitrators have exclusive jurisdiction. Weber did not stand for
the proposition that labour arbitrators always have exclusive jurisdiction
when a dispute arises relating to the conditions of employment of unionized
employees. Indeed, there are many aspects of the employer-employee
relationship that do not stem from the collective agreement. Morin was
an example of a case in which the essential character of the dispute was
determined to be a human rights matter that did not stem from the collective
agreement. There, the issue to be determined was whether the addition of a
new term of collective agreement discriminated against certain employees.
The Supreme Court of Canada held that labour arbitration was not the only
forum and that having the matter decided by the Human Rights Tribunal
was a better fit.
Justice Bastarache was of the opinion that Concordia, too, is a case
in which labour arbitrators do not have exclusive jurisdiction. Justice
Bastarache interpreted Weber as indicating that the matter must arise out
of “a single collective agreement, concluded between a single union
and the employer” in order to be subject to a labour arbitrator’s exclusive
jurisdiction.85 For Bastarache J., the fact that the pension plan represented
one indivisible patrimony was a very big element that deserved more
attention than LeBel J. had given it. The pension fund transcended any
one collective agreement. A necessary implication of this was that every
beneficiary of the plan, regardless of the collective agreement with which
84
85
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he or she was affiliated, was affected by the changes to the plan of
which the respondent complained. Viewed in light of these attributes,
the respondent’s claim could not logically be located in any one collective
agreement. There was a connection that linked all of the beneficiaries of
the pension funds, however, that came from the way that the changes to
the fund affected all of the beneficiaries and the resulting claim that they
wished to make. While the collective agreement served as the reason
why the respondent had an interest in the financing of the pension fund,
this was not enough to say that the essential character of the respondent’s
claim stemmed from the collective agreement. Justice Bastarache also
noted that identifying the essential character of the dispute as arising
from the collective agreements would result in various parties dictating the
management of the fund for every other beneficiary by labour arbitrators
including beneficiaries over whom a particular labour arbitrator may not
have jurisdiction.
Justice Bastarache argued that the labour arbitrator did not have
in personam jurisdiction. While LeBel J. had limited the parties to the
respondent and Concordia University, Bastarache J. reasoned that it was
more accurate to recognize that all beneficiaries of the fund could claim
to be involved and that a labour arbitrator would not have jurisdiction
over all these parties.
Finally, unlike the majority, Bastarache J. was of the opinion that the
possibility of inconsistent decisions merely confirmed that the essential
character of Mr. Bisaillon’s claim arose out of the plan itself and not the
collective agreement.86
Justice Bastarache held that the risk of contradictory rulings in this
case was inevitable in both theory and practice. As a practical matter,
Bastarache J. pointed out that Lebel J. had himself identified the incentive
for employees to bring multiple claims. Justice Lebel had noted that:
“Assuming the worst, if there were contradictory or incompatible arbitration
awards, Concordia could probably, subject to the limited possible grounds
for judicial review by the Superior Court, resolve any conflict by complying
with the award least favourable to it.”87 Although Lebel J. saw this as a
reason for conflicting judgments to work themselves out, Bastarache J.
was of the opinion that this was the catalyst for a constant reopening of
the dispute over financing of the pension fund. Justice Bastarache reasoned
that so long as the arbitrator rendered a decision that was unsatisfactory
86
87

Id., at para. 69 and see supra, note 84 and accompanying text.
Id., at para. 60.

96

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2007), 38 S.C.L.R. (2d)

to one of the remaining eight unions, it would be inevitable that the
dispute would be reopened.
But Justice Bastarache found it even more worrisome that there
was a risk of contradictory rulings in theory. Here, his concern centred on
clarifying the proper application of the Weber test. Justice Bastarache
emphasized very strongly the unusual nature of the contradictory claims
that would arise from the majority’s conclusion that the essential
character of the dispute could be located in the collective agreements
and employment contracts. Unlike many situations of inconsistency that
arise in legal interpretation,88 the majority’s holding would lead to the
situation where the same indivisible pension fund would be set to contain
a certain amount of money by one arbitrator in a different amount
of money by another. Justice Bastarache noted that this is the kind of
inconsistency “that purports to resolve the same, singular claim in
different ways”.89
In Bastarache J.’s opinion, it would be impossible to reconcile
contradictory orders of this nature. He noted that the jurisdictional absurdity
of the situation that was sure to ensue from the majority’s disposition
was aggravated by two additional factors. First, the university would be
bound by all the arbitration decisions, including the contradictory ones.
Second, he took a precursory appreciation of the standard of review,
observing that it was likely that the various arbitrators’ decisions would
merit some deference. As a consequence, resorting to judicial review to
reconcile contradictory arbitral orders would not necessarily be a successful
task as each order may escape being overturned by being sufficiently
reasonable.
Justice Bastarache completed his analysis with a comment on the
Weber test and the notion of the essential character of the dispute. He
held that the notion of an essential character cannot be given such a
broad meaning as to allow a single dispute to arise out of many different
sources simultaneously, with each yielding jurisdiction for different forums.
If the Weber test is applied in this way, as was done by the majority, its
insight will be defeated.

88
For example, situations in which a legislative provision is interpreted differently or in which
the same legislative provision is applied differently by different arbitrators to a similar set of facts.
89
See Concordia University, supra, note 5, at para. 93.
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IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In 2007, two decisions dealing with standard of review were released
by the Supreme Court, City of Lévis and Via Rail. Both dealt with
determining when multiple standards of review, as opposed to one standard
of review, should apply to the decision or order of an administrative body.
1. Lévis (City) v. Fraternité des policiers de Lévis Inc.
City of Lévis90 is a decision that deals with issues of standard of
review, statutory interpretation, municipal law and police discipline/ethics.
In City of Lévis, a municipal police officer charged with criminal conduct
was dismissed by the municipality. His union filed a grievance on his
behalf which led to many levels of judicial review of an arbitrator’s
decision.
Rendering the case somewhat complex is the fact that two statutes
govern the discipline of municipal police officers in Québec: the Police
Act91 and the Cities and Towns Act.92 Moreover, the two Acts come into
conflict respecting the sanctions they provide to discipline police officers
charged with criminal offences.
More specifically, section 119 of the Police Act provides for automatic
dismissal of any police officer found guilty of an offence under the
Criminal Code.93 Paragraph 2 of section 119 allows for an exception to
90
Lévis (City) v. Fraternité des policiers de Lévis Inc., [2007] S.C.J. No. 14, 2007 SCC 14
[hereinafter “City of Lévis”].
91
R.S.Q. c. P-13.1 [hereinafter “Police Act”].
92
R.S.Q. c. C-19 [hereinafter “Cities and Towns Act”].
93
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. Section 119 of the Police Act, supra, note 91, states:
119. Any police officer or special constable who is found guilty, in any place, of an act
or omission referred to in subparagraph 3 of the first paragraph of section 115 that is triable
only on indictment, shall, once the judgment has become res judicata, be automatically dismissed.
A disciplinary sanction of dismissal must, once the judgment concerned has become
res judicata, be imposed on any police officer or special constable who is found guilty, in
any place, of such an act or omission punishable on summary conviction or by indictment,
unless the police officer or special constable shows that specific circumstances justify another
sanction.
(Emphasis added)
This section relates to s. 115(3) of the Police Act, id., which reads:
115. To be hired as a police officer a person must meet the following requirements:
.....

(3) not have been found guilty, in any place, of an act or omission defined in the Criminal
Code (Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985, chapter C-46) as an offence, or of an offence
referred to in section 183 of that Code under one of the Acts listed therein;
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this general sanction. This exception was created to allow for less
stringent discipline of police officers in cases where dismissal would be
disproportionately harsh. It requires the police officer to demonstrate
that another sanction should apply. In addition to the Police Act, the
Cities and Towns Act also provides sanctions for municipal police officer
misconduct. Subsection 116(6) of the Cities and Towns Act provides
that individuals who have been convicted of an act that is punishable
under a law of the Parliament of Canada or the Québec legislature and that
entails a year’s imprisonment or more shall be disqualified from being
an officer of the municipality. The disqualification lasts for five years.
Furthermore, the disqualification applies only if the offence committed
by the individual relates to the municipal office or employment that he or
she holds.94 Because Mr. Belleau, the officer in question in City of Lévis,
was a municipal police officer, both statutes could apply.
The labour arbitrator who heard Mr. Belleau’s grievance was therefore
faced with two major issues to determine. The first was the question of
determining whether the Police Act or the Cities and Towns Act should
apply to the conduct of Mr. Belleau. A second question of the appropriate
sanction to discipline Mr. Belleau’s conduct then had to be addressed.
On judicial review, a further issue arose regarding whether these
interrelated questions should attract two distinct standards of review.
The labour arbitrator held that the Police Act was the applicable law.
His reasoning was based on the theory of statutory interpretation that
maintains that a special law prevails over a general law when two laws
are in conflict. As a consequence, the arbitrator determined that section 119,
paragraph 2 had rendered subsection 116(6) of the Cities and Towns Act
inapplicable to municipal police officers. In terms of applying the Police
Act, the arbitrator determined that he had jurisdiction to consider the
94

Subsection 116(6) of the Cities and Towns Act, supra, note 92, provides:
116. The following persons shall not be appointed to or hold any office as an officer or
employee of the municipality:
.....
(6) a person convicted of treason or of an act punishable under a law of the Parliament
of Canada or of the Legislature of Québec, by imprisonment for one year or more.
Such disqualification shall continue for five years after the term of imprisonment fixed
by the sentence, and, if only a fine was imposed or the sentence is suspended, for five years
from the date of such condemnation, unless the person has obtained a pardon;
.....
Disqualification from municipal office or employment under subparagraph 6 or 7 of
the first paragraph shall be incurred only if the offence is in connection with such an office
or employment.
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circumstances surrounding the criminal acts and to determine if they
negated the requirement of a dismissal.95 He held that there were indeed
special circumstances warranting a lesser sanction. The arbitrator therefore
set aside the municipality’s decision and ordered that the officer be
reinstated without compensation. In essence, the arbitrator’s order
amounted to a 16-month suspension without pay. Mr. Belleau had been
charged with offences relating to the careless storage of firearms in his
home. In the arbitrator’s view, these were “technical” offences. The
arbitrator took into consideration, in reaching its conclusion, that Mr.
Belleau had recently moved into the house where he was living, that it
was undergoing extensive renovations and that there was no place in the
house where firearms could have been safely stored. As regards Mr.
Belleau’s violence towards his spouse and the breach of his undertaking
not to communicate with her, the arbitrator held that although these
offences are serious, the expert medical opinion that he was in a morbid
state due to family problems and that he was intoxicated should be taken
into account. Finally, as for public perception, the arbitrator determined
that the public had been misinformed by the media of the circumstances of
the officer’s case. He was also of the opinion that the officer’s supervisors
and colleagues would regain confidence in him once they were informed
of the true circumstances. These attenuating factors helped the arbitrator
to reach the conclusion that Mr. Belleau should be reinstated but that he
should undergo a period of suspension without pay.96
At the Superior Court of Québec, Lemelin J. determined that one
standard of review, patent unreasonableness, should apply to the entire
arbitral decision. Justice Lemelin held that the arbitrator’s decision that
the Cities and Towns Act was inapplicable constituted a reviewable error.
In his opinion, there was no indication by the legislature that it intended
to exclude municipal police officers from the reach of the Cities and
Towns Act. Justice Lemelin held that the Cities and Towns Act applied
and should have led the arbitrator to dismiss Mr. Belleau from his duties.
The Superior Court also found the arbitrator’s application of section 119,
95
In reaching this conclusion, the arbitrator held that his jurisdiction under s. 119, para. 2
was equivalent to an arbitrator’s jurisdiction in relation to disciplinary matters under the Québec
Labour Code, R.S.Q. c. C-27, s. 100.12(f).
96
The arbitrator considered other attenuating factors as well. These included the length of the
officer’s employment with the municipality, the lack of any previous disciplinary problems,
testimony by his ex-spouses that he was not a violent man by nature, the fact that the officer was off
duty when the offences occurred, the fact that he did not cause physical harm to his wife and that
there was no evidence of physical violence. Moreover, the arbitrator considered that Mr. Belleau had
recovered from his family and alcohol problems and that there was little risk of him re-offending.
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paragraph 2 of the Police Act to be patently unreasonable. Justice Lemelin
was of the view that the expert opinion led by the officer on the issue of
his alcoholism was not convincing and should not have been accepted.
He held that since the arbitrator’s conclusion on this point was central to
his decision, it rendered his entire decision patently unreasonable.97
The union and the police officer appealed from the Superior Court
decision to the Québec Court of Appeal,98 where the Court held that two
different standards of review were necessary as the arbitrator’s decision
raised separate questions. In the Court’s opinion, the question of whether
the Cities and Towns Act and the Police Act are compatible attracted a
reasonableness standard of review. The arbitrator’s decision rendered
under section 119 of the Police Act, on the other hand, should be evaluated
on a standard of patent unreasonableness. In reviewing the arbitrator’s
decision, the Court of Appeal held that the arbitrator had not committed
any reviewable errors. Like the arbitrator, the Court of Appeal was of
the opinion that the two statutes were in conflict and that the Police Act
should prevail. Its analysis was based on two presumptions of statutory
interpretation: the first being that a new law is intended to prevail over an
old law; the second being that a special law is intended to take precedence
over a general one. As regards the application of the Police Act, the Court
of Appeal was of the view that the arbitrator was entitled to consider the
technical nature of the firearm offences and the officer’s family crisis in
determining if any specific circumstances existed. The Court of Appeal
held that the arbitrator’s finding regarding Mr. Belleau’s alcoholism did
not play a central role in the arbitrator’s decision and was not in itself
patently unreasonable. In the end, the Court of Appeal restored the
arbitrator’s award.
The city appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. The issues before
the Court were the question of the appropriate standard or standards of
review to apply, whether the arbitrator had chosen the correct statutes to
govern the municipal police officer’s discipline and whether the arbitrator
had committed a reviewable error in finding that the officer should
receive a sanction other than dismissal under section 119, paragraph 2 of
the Police Act. The majority of the Court held that this was a case in
which more than one standard of review should apply. Moreover, it was
held that the Cities and Towns Act and that the Police Act were in conflict
and that the Police Act should take precedence in this case. Finally, the
97
98

Ville de Lévis c. Côté, [2003] J.Q. no 13008 (S.C.).
Fraternité des policiers de Lévis c. Lévis (Ville de), [2005] J.Q. no 8450 (C.A.).
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majority held that the arbitrator failed to take into account the gravity
of the offences and the effect that they would have on public confidence.
Consequently, the arbitrator committed a reviewable error in reaching
the conclusion that there were specific circumstances warranting a sanction
less serious than dismissal. Although all the justices were in agreement
that the arbitrator’s decision could not be sustained, they presented three
sets of concurring decisions. Justice Bastarache wrote the majority opinion
in which MacLachlin C.J., Binnie and Charron JJ. concurred. Separate
concurring reasons were penned by Deschamps and Fish JJ. Finally,
Abella J. provided concurring reasons as well.
(a) Majority Concurring Reasons: Chief Justice McLachlin and
Bastarache, Binnie and Charron JJ.
Writing for the majority, Bastarache J. started his analysis by
addressing the standard of review. He held that two distinct standards of
review were required for the separate concerns that arose in this case.
Using the pragmatic and functional approach, Bastarache J. determined
that the conflict of law question attracted a standard of correctness while
the interpretation and application of the applicable law was reviewable
on a standard of reasonableness.
Justice Bastarache offered useful theoretical guidance on how to
determine when multiple standards of review should apply. He observed
that the pragmatic and functional approach may lead to different standards
of review for separate findings, although this is not always the case.
Most frequently, administrative decision-makers called upon to construe
statutes that are external to their enabling legislation, may face a different
standard of review for the interpretation of the external question of law.
On many occasions, interpretations of external legislation have been
reviewed on a standard of correctness. However, Bastarache J. pointed
out that this is not a hard and fast rule and that the appropriate standard
of review will depend on a proper application of the pragmatic and
functional approach.99
As a general principle, Bastarache J. indicated that the presence or
absence of a privative clause will likely have the least influence on
determining whether more than one standard of review are applicable.
99
Although Bastarache J.’s comments on multiple standards of review in City of Lévis,
supra, note 90, at para. 19 at times referred to the situation of arbitrators specifically, he appears to
have been making observations that apply to administrative decision-makers generally.
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This is because the presence or absence of a privative clause is generally
the same for all aspects of an administrative decision. More important to
the analysis of determining whether multiple standards apply, is whether
there exist questions of different natures and whether those questions
engage the decision-maker’s expertise and the legislative objective in
different ways.
Ultimately, the question of determining whether more than one
standard of review applies to a decision comes down to a question of
balancing. Justice Bastarache warned that the possibility of multiple
standards “should not be taken as a licence to parse an administrative
decision into myriad parts”.100 On the other hand, reviewing courts must
be careful not to envelop distinct questions into one broad standard of
review. As well, while it may not always be easy to separate individual
questions from the entire decision, multiple standards of review should be
adopted “when there are clearly defined questions that engage different
concerns under the pragmatic and functional approach”.101
Once the majority had determined the appropriate standard of review,
the more substantive questions regarding the appropriate law to apply to
the municipal police officer was addressed. In reaching the conclusion that
section 119, paragraph 2 of the Police Act and subsection 116(6) of the
Cities and Towns Act conflict, the majority was of the opinion that there
is a clear zone where the practical effect of the two statutory provisions
could not be reconciled. For many of the same offences, the Police Act
might allow a police officer to maintain his employment with the
municipality if he or she can show specific circumstances where the Cities
and Towns Act cannot. Justice Bastarache held that the application of the
Cities and Towns Act would necessarily preclude the application of
the exception in the Police Act. As a consequence, this situation is one
in which “one enactment says ‘yes’ and the other says ‘no’”.102
In determining that the Police Act should prevail, the majority
sought to ascertain the legislature’s intent. Because there was no express
indication of which law should prevail, the majority also relied on the
two presumptions of statutory interpretation: that more recent laws should
prevail over earlier laws and that special laws should take precedence over
general ones. The Police Act was both more recent and more specific.
100

City of Lévis, id., at para. 19.
Id.
102
Justice Bastarache quoting id., at para. 49, the test from Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon,
[1982] S.C.J. No. 66, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161, at 191.
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Furthermore, the majority noted from the legislative debates that the
exception for specific circumstances was created to meet the concerns of
police associations who believed that it may not always be fair to dismiss
a police officer convicted of a hybrid offence. Applying subsection 116(6)
of the Cities and Towns Act to municipal police officers who have
committed hybrid offences would undermine this objective.103
As for whether “specific circumstances” existed in this situation, the
majority held that they did not. The majority asserted that in determining
whether specific circumstances exist, it is important to take into account
the special role of police officers and the effect of a criminal conviction
on their capacity to carry out their functions. The majority did not share
the arbitrator’s opinion that the firearm offences could be attributed to
Mr. Belleau’s personal problems or characterized as technical offences.
More important in the majority’s view was Mr. Belleau’s breach of
undertaking with the court not to communicate with his spouse. This
showed a lack of respect for the judicial system of which he was an
integral part. In sum, the arbitrator failed to weigh properly the effect of
the police officer’s criminal conduct on his ability to carry out his duties
as a police officer. This had a negative impact on the rationality of the
arbitrator’s decision. Moreover, the arbitrator failed to take into account
the seriousness of the offences committed by the police officer and the
effect that they would have on public confidence. In sum, the arbitrator’s
103
Justice Bastarache dismissed three arguments made by the city as to why the Cities and
Towns Act should prevail. The first was that the Police Act contained no express exclusion of the Cities
and Towns Act. The Cities and Towns Act had been modified several times after the Police Act had
been enacted. However, on none of these occasions did the legislature modify the application of ss.
116(6). Justice Bastarache did not find this line of reasoning persuasive. In his opinion, since there
was no express legislative intent whatsoever, it could just as easily be said that s. 119 of the Police
Act was intended to apply to all police officers without distinction. The second argument was that
the legislative debates surrounding s. 119, para. 2 of the Police Act did not mention ss. 116(6) of the
Cities and Towns Act. The city argued that this was also evidence that the Cities and Towns Act was
to take precedence over the Police Act. By contrast, Bastarache J. held that this seemed to be further
evidence that the legislature intended s. 119, para. 2 of the Police Act to apply equally to all police
officers. He reasoned that if municipal police officers were to be excluded, one would expect that
this point would have been raised in the legislative discussions. Finally, the city argued that
allowing the Police Act to prevail over the Cities and Towns Act would create two classes of municipal
employees with municipal police officers being treated more leniently than other municipal employees. In
Bastarache J.’s view, however, this was an unfounded concern. It did not speak to the fact that the
opposite situation allowing the Cities and Towns Act to prevail would also create two classes of
police officers which may be contrary to the intention behind s. 119 of the Police Act. He also noted
that municipal police officers were treated differently from other police officers before the enactment
of s. 119, para. 2 of the Police Act because ss. 116(6) specified that disqualification would only be
incurred if the offence was in connection with the municipal office held. He also disagreed that
municipal police officers would be treated more leniently if the Police Act were to prevail since
they are required to show specific circumstances.
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conclusion that the specific circumstances raised by the officer were
sufficient to satisfy the exception in section 119 of Police Act was
unreasonable.
(b) Minority Concurring Reasons: Justices Deschamps and Fish
Justices Deschamps and Fish agreed with Bastarache J.’s conclusion
that the Police Act applied to the facts of the case. Implicitly, they also
agreed with the standards of review proposed by Bastarache J. However,
they did not agree that the Police Act and the Cities and Towns Act conflict.
In the opinion of Deschamps and Fish JJ., this was not a situation in
which one enactment says “yes” and the other says “no”. It was possible
to reconcile the two statutes, especially when there are no specific
circumstances to justify a sanction other than dismissal.104
(c) Minority Concurring Reasons: Justice Abella
Justice Abella agreed with Bastarache J.’s conclusion that the Police
Act and the Cities and Towns Act conflict and that the Police Act should
prevail in these circumstances. She took issue, however, with Bastarache
104

Justices Deschamps and Fish offered the following three scenarios as a full answer to
the contention that s. 119, para. 2 of the Police Act and ss. 116(6) of the Cities and Towns Act could
not apply concurrently (see City of Lévis, supra, note 90, at para. 91):
(1) Where a municipal police officer commits an indictable offence. In such a case, the
first paragraph of s. 119 P.A. provides that dismissal from the police force is automatic.
Section 116 C.T.A. imposes a five-year disqualification from employment by the municipality
except where the offence is not in connection with the office or employment. (This exception
implicitly does not apply to police officers because there will generally be a connection
between the commission of an indictable offence and employment as a police officer.) After
five years, the dismissed officer is still ineligible, under s. 115 P.A., to be rehired as a police
officer, but can be hired as a municipal employee in any other capacity. There is no conflict
under this scenario, and both laws can apply concurrently.
(2) Where a municipal police officer commits a crime that is a hybrid offence punishable
by imprisonment for one year or more and there are no specific circumstances that justify a
sanction other than dismissal. Both laws can apply concurrently in the same manner as in
scenario (1).
(3) Where a municipal police officer commits a crime that is a hybrid offence punishable
by imprisonment for one year or more but there are specific circumstances that justify a
sanction other than dismissal from employment as a police officer. In this case, the officer is
not dismissed from the municipal police force but, in light of s. 116 C.T.A., is nonetheless
disqualified for five years from employment by the municipality. After five years, however, the
officer requalifies as an employee of the municipality. During the five years of disqualification,
the officer can work as a police officer for the Sureté du Québec or as a special constable, or
can work for a municipality in any capacity where the offence is not in connection with the
office or employment. The two laws can apply concurrently.
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J.’s analysis and conclusion regarding the standard of review. In Abella J.’s
opinion, only one standard of review should apply to both the arbitrator’s
decision regarding which law to apply and to his application of the law.
Unlike Bastarache J., who held that the absence or presence of a
privative clause will assist little in an analysis of whether more than one
standard is necessary, Abella J. placed significant emphasis on the privative
clause in determining the appropriate standard(s) of review. Justice Abella
pointed out that the Labour Code contained an unequivocal privative
clause that bound the parties with no appeal.105 She noted also that an
arbitrator acting within his or her jurisdiction under the Labour Code
had the power to “interpret and apply any Act or regulation to the extent
necessary to settle a grievance”.106 In Abella J.’s opinion, these were
clear legislative indications that should be taken into account in any
assessment of the degree of deference owed to an arbitrator. Moreover,
she considered that the expertise of the arbitrator in labour disputes and
the legislative intent of having them resolved quickly and with finality
were factors that militated towards an integrated standard of review.
Justice Abella warned against the unduly interventionist approach
that could result from the desire of reviewing courts to parse routinely
the mandate of administrative decision-makers. In her opinion, such an
interventionist approach was more in line with the older doctrine of
collateral question than with the more modern and deferential approach
espoused by the pragmatic and functional approach. She asserted that
issues that are legitimately and necessarily intertwined with an adjudicator’s
mandate and expertise should lead to the decision being reviewed as a
whole “not as a segmented compilation subject to an increased degree of
scrutiny and intervention”.107 On the other hand, legal issues that are
genuinely external to the adjudicator’s mandate or expertise and easily
differentiated from other issues in the case may legitimately attract
heightened scrutiny.
In this particular case, however, the labour arbitrator’s mandate and
expertise entitled him to a single deferential standard of review. This
standard, which she seems to agree was reasonableness, should apply
both to his decision regarding the scope of the relevant legislation and its
application. The question of parsing administrative decisions to determine
105
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if multiple standards of review should apply is one that was taken up
again in Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. Via Rail Canada Inc.108
2. Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. Via Rail Canada Inc.
Decided the day after City of Lévis, Via Rail also addressed the
question of when a single standard of review should apply. This time,
however, unlike City of Lévis, it was held that one single standard of review
should apply although the decision in question arguably contained several
parts. Via Rail is a rich decision that addresses standard of review, human
rights (specifically, the duty to accommodate passengers with abilities)
and the validity of voluntary codes within administrative contexts. This
discussion will restrict itself to the primarily administrative law debate
that took place over how to decide when multiple standards of review
should apply.
Via Rail dealt with the review of a decision of the Canadian
Transportation Agency (“CTA”, “agency”). The agency had held that
Via Rail’s purchase of a new set of rail cars (the “Renaissance cars”) had
not been properly modified to meet accessibility standards for persons
with disabilities. Under the 1998 Code of Practice—Passenger Rail Car
Accessibility Terms and Conditions of Carriage by Rail of Persons with
Disabilities (“Rail Code”), a voluntary code of conduct that Via Rail
(“VIA”) had negotiated and to which it agreed, new rail cars undergoing
major refurbishment were required to be designed to allow passengers
with disabilities to use their personal wheelchairs on the train. The Council
of Canadians with Disabilities applied to the agency under the Canada
Transportation Act.109 It argued that 46 features of the Renaissance cars
constituted undue obstacles to the mobility of persons with disabilities. The
Council relied in part on VIA’s alleged non-compliance with the Rail Code.
VIA argued that the Rail Code standards that were relevant were
those applicable to existing cars. VIA submitted that the Renaissance
cars met these standards and that it was not required to retrofit them to
improve accessibility. Throughout the agency’s inquiry, VIA was less
than cooperative, filing incomplete data and rendering the agency’s
inquiry difficult to accomplish. On March 27, 2003, the agency issued a
preliminary decision that took the form of a “show cause” order. Through
this order, VIA was asked to show cause by May 26, 2003, why obstacles
108
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that the agency had identified as undue obstacles were not in fact undue
obstacles. In April 2003, VIA sought leave to appeal from the preliminary
order. In August 2003, VIA indicated to the agency that it did not intend
to comply with its preliminary order. VIA asked the agency for an oral
hearing, if necessary, or for the agency to render its decision in final form.
The agency rendered its final decision on October 29, 2003 based
on the record it had before it. The agency ordered Via Rail to implement
six remedial measures, five of which involved making physical changes
to the Renaissance cars. Via Rail appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal.
With its application for appeal, it submitted a commissioned cost estimate
dated less than 40 days after the agency’s final decision.
The majority of the Federal Court of Appeal was of the opinion that
more than one standard should apply.110 For what was termed the
“jurisdictional question”, the majority held that correctness was the
appropriate standard. The question was whether the CTA possessed
the authority to inquire into whether undue obstacles exist when no disabled
individual had in fact encountered an undue obstacle to mobility. All factors
of the pragmatic and functional test militated towards less deference
being shown to the agency. Although there was no privative clause per se,
the Court of Appeal relied on its past jurisprudence which had held that
a lower level of deference is necessary for questions coming through the
statutory right of appeal available for the CTA. The relative expertise of
the agency was less than that of the Court on this, a question of statutory
interpretation. Moreover, the provisions of the Canada Transportation Act
to be interpreted had a human rights aspect which did not fit naturally
with the agency’s primary function of implementing regulatory provisions.
Finally, as the nature of the question was statutory interpretation, less
deference was to be owed.
With respect to the interpretation of the Canada Transportation Act,
the question of whether the obstacles were undue and the balancing of
interests to be done as part of this analysis was held to attract a very
high level of deference. The Federal Court of Appeal was unanimous
that the standard of patent unreasonableness should apply. Applying the
pragmatic and functional approach, the agency was held to have more
expertise in regulatory matters; the nature of the question was polycentric;
110
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there was a strong privative clause and the questions addressed were of
mixed fact and law.
In Via Rail, Abella J., who had asserted her ideas about the dangers
of courts routinely segmenting administrative tribunal decisions and
applying different standards of review to their component parts in City
of Lévis, garnered the support of the majority on this point. Writing on
behalf of McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache, Lebel and Charron JJ., Abella J.
held that the agency’s decision as a whole was most appropriately
decided on a patent unreasonableness standard. In the majority’s view,
the issue of whether the agency had the power to determine if an undue
obstacle existed without an underlying factual basis was not a preliminary
jurisdictional question falling outside of the agency’s expertise.
Consequently, Abella J. held that this question should not be subject to a
different standard of review.
(a) Commentary
Justice Abella’s analysis is particularly refreshing in its re-assertion
of an approach to determining standard of review that privileges
legislative intent. Justice Abella reasons that labelling as “jurisdictional”
and subjecting to a correctness standard a decision of an administrative
body when that decision flows naturally from provisions of its enabling
statute, will only lead to diminishing the role of tribunals to fact-finding.
For Abella J., this approach threatens the specialized expertise which is
foundational to tribunals and to the deference that they are owed.111 In
this regard, Abella J. cautions that such an approach “has the capacity to
unravel the essence of the decision and undermine the very characteristic
of the Agency which entitles it to the highest level of deference from a
court — its specialized expertise”.112 Adopting such a stance of wide
curial review also encourages courts to overlook the expertise that a
tribunal may bring to the exercise of interpreting its enabling legislation
and defining the scope of its statutory authority.113
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At the same time, one can foresee difficulties in applying Abella J.’s
approach. For example, while the approach works very well in situations
like Via Rail where the human rights related provisions are embedded in
the enabling statute, it may be more difficult to demonstrate that the
interpretation of the provisions that are inextricably linked with a
decision-maker’s decision that stem from a different piece of legislation
should share the same degree of deference.114 This issue is raised at a
particularly interesting time in light of the decision of Tranchemontagne115
discussed earlier. To use Tranchemontagne as an example, the majority
held that any administrative body should be able to determine if a
provision of its enabling statute that it is mandated to administer is
discriminatory under the Ontario Human Rights Code. There will be
situations similar to Tranchemontagne where this question (whether the
provision restricting admissibility for social benefits) is intimately linked
the overall finding of the case (whether benefits should be awarded).
Should such a question be subject to a correctness standard as a preliminary
jurisdictional issue or is it so connected to the work of the social benefits
tribunal in that particular decision that one could argue for integrated
standard of review?
As well, there is the more obvious and practical challenge of
reconciling this case with City of Lévis, decided just the day before Via
Rail. In City of Lévis, the majority of the Court had supported the use of
multiple standards of review. Unfortunately, the two decisions do not refer
to each other, leaving their eventual reconciliation to future case law.
Undoubtedly, questions surrounding integrated versus multiple
standards of review and when each one should be applied are certain to
recur. This issue is also timely as it connects with other questions relating
to standard review, such as the question raised by Lebel J. in Toronto (City)
v. C.U.P.E., Local 79116 about whether three standards are necessary or
whether two will suffice. Like exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction, the
issue of integrated versus multiple standards of review raises questions
of the appropriate way to discern and follow legislative intent.
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V. CONCLUSION
Human rights matters have played a significant role in driving the
developments in administrative law over the past two terms. By far,
there was a strong emergence of cases in the 2005-2006 and 2006-2007
terms that touched on the relationship between administrative law and
human rights principles. As well, questions of exclusive and concurrent
jurisdiction continued to plague the court. Finally, particularly in the
2006-2007 term, one saw a stringent debate arise over whether integrated
or multiple standards of review best served the purpose of pursuing
legislative intent.

